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1. SUMMARY: Whether resps were barred from federal habeas 
relief under~inwright v. ~ke~ by Ohio's contemporaneous 
\..___- objection rule, when they failed to object to jury instructions -
placing on them the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense. 
-2-
2. BACKGROUND: These a re ~~~ons~ ca~ Each 
.., 
resp was indicted for a criminal offense in Ohio and each was 
found guilty of a lesser included offense after a jury trial. In 
each case, the resp relied upon the affirmative defens~ ~f self-
defense. _ _,. In each case no objection was entered to the trial 
'--
court's jury instruction that the defendant bore the burden of 
---------~---------------------------proof on self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
---> -~ ~ 
Sentencing for ~~j i nd each was sentenced to a 
prison term. 
Subsequent to their convictions, the Ohio Supreme Court 
.._____ ~ l .... t ( - ,, 
concluded th~t solely ~a m! tter g_f _st~ law, O.R.C. 
§2901.05(a) (effective January 1, 1974) changed the traditional 
common-law rule that a defendant has the burden of proof by a ------ -- -------=--------·~--------· ~ 
p~~~~~e~~f.fir~~ dcle-nses. Und~: the~-
new law, the defendant has~ the ' hurden of coming forward withAu~. 
'\ /.., r- -:r 
sufficient evidence to create an issue as to the affirmative ~
defense. The Stat~ ' then has the burden of proving beyond a ~~ 
reasonable doubt the nonexistence of the affirmative defense. ~" 
Stat~ v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103 (1976). In a subsequent 
decision, State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95 (1977), the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that although the interpretation of O.R.C. 
§2901.05(a) reached in Robinson was fully applicable to all 
trials conducted after January 1, 1974, a defendant who did not 
object to the charge on that ba s is would be precluded from 
relief. 
Resp Isaac appealed his conviction, relying upon Rob~nson. 
The appellate court affirmed because he had failed to ob j ect to 
-3-
the instruction. The Ohio Sup. Ct. denied Isaac relief on the 
same day that it decided Humphries. Resps Bell and Hughes 
appealed their convictions, but did not raise the issue of the 
adequacy of the jury instructions on self-defense. Subsequently 
all three resps filed habeas petitions in Federal District Court 
and in all three instances the courts denied relief. A panel of 
the CA 6 subsequently voted to reverse Isaac~. The majority of 
the panel (Beck & Phillips) found that the Ohio Sup. Ct.'s 
selective denial of the benefit of the Robinson decision was 
itself arbitary and capricious and thus a denial of Due Process. 
It did not consider the question of whether the instruction 
itself violated Due Process. Because the major thrust of petr's 
claim was not directed at the constitutionality of the jury 
instruction itself, but rather a1~he constitutionality of the 
selective application of Robinson, Wainwright v. §3-kes was held 
not to be applicable. A rehearing en bane was granted. 
Sometime during the proceedings in the courts below, Hughes 
and Isaac were granted final releases as a matter of parole and 
thus have served their sentences. Bell is still in prison. 
3. DECISION BELOW: 
Isaac: Judge Brown, joined by Judges Weick, Keefe & 
Martin, wrote the plurality opinion. Judge Brown rejected the 
approach of the CA 6 panel, which has focused on the arbitrary 
and capricious nature of selective retroactivity: "We believe 
that the more appropriate focus is on the underlying claim, in 
this case the constitutional validity of the jury instructions . 
• • as considered in light of Robinson and Humohries." On this 
-4-
point, the threshold issue was \- 1hether or not the state 
procedural rule effectively precludes federal habeas review. 
Noting that the "cause" and "prejudice" standards of Wainwright 
still remain "somewhat undefined," Judge Brown concluded that the 
circumstances of this case sati s fied both standards. "Cause" was 
found in the fact that there was no indication at the time of 
trial that the jury instructions were contrary to state law: the 
instructions were in accordance with well-established state law. 
Because the burden of proof is a critical element of the fact-
finding process, prejudice was established by an error in the 
allocation of that burden. Having found that Isaac met the 
criteria set forth in Wainwright, the plurality went on to 
/ 
consider the substantive constitutional claim under Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 u.s. 684 (1975), and ~tterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197 (1977). The court read these cases to have held that while a 
state is largely free to define crimes as it chooses, ~ess 
~ 
requires that it prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element s of 
the crime as defined. Although self-defense does not negate an 
~
element of the crime involved here as defined by th e Ohio 
statute, the plurality found "no practical difference between 
requiring a state to prove the e lements of crimes beyond a 
reasonable doubt and requiring it to meet it~ assumed burden of 
proving absence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable 
doubt." In effect, the plurali t y held that despite the language 
I I 
of the statute, the absence of s elf-defense is an element of the 
-5-
Chief Judge Edwards .concurred in the result, but argued that 
under In re WinshJE, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and Mullaney the Due 
Process Clause requires that the burden of proof of criminal 
intent be placed on the prosecution. In his view, criminal 
intent of aggravated assault and self-defense are completely 
irreconcilable. Therefore, to require a defendant to carry the 
burden of proof on self-defense is to require him to disprove 
criminal intent. He joined the plurality opinion on the 
Wainwright issue. Judge Jones concurred separately and seems to 
rely primarily on the reasoning of the original panel decision. 
Judge Lively dissented. In his view Robinson did not place 
the burden on the state of disproving affirmative defenses beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Judge Kennedy dissented, arguing that the 
cause aftd prejudice exception of Wainwright does not apply in 
this case. He relied primarily on a footnote in Hankerson v . 
. 
North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 244 n. 8 (1977), which stated that: 
"The states if they wish may be able to insulate 
past convictions by enforcing the normal and 
valid rule that failure to object to a jury 
instruction is waiver of any claim of error." 
In Hankerson, the Court held Mu l laney to be retroactive; it made 
the above remark in the context of a discussion of the impact of 
its decision on the administrat i on of justice. In Judge 
Kennedy's view, if a change in interpretation of the law provides 
"cause" for a defendant's failu ~ e to object at trial sufficient 
to satisfy Wainwright, then th e impact on the administration of 
justice of making that interpretation retroactive can never be 
~ mitigated by application of the state's contemporaneous objection 
rules. This would be contrary to the suggestion in Hankerson . 
. . 
-6-
Moreover, the trial in tpis case was held three months after 
Mullaney was decided and, therefore, the rule of that case was 
not new or unanticipated. Judge Merritt dissented separately, 
but agreed with the reasoning of Judge Kennedy on the Wainwright 
issue. 
On the same day that the Isaac decision carne out, a panel of 
the CA 6 (Merritt, Brown & Martin) decided the ~ell case. Judge 
Brown wrote the opinion and specifically adopted his opinion for 
the plurality in Isaac. Judge Kerritt dissented, citing his 
dissent in Isaac. 
A panel of the CA 6 (Kennedy, Martin & Phillips) decided the 
Hughes case several days later. The panel issued a brief order, 
relying on Isaac. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the decision of the CA 
6 is in direct conflict with Hankerson, ~~a, and with the ~Q 
bane decision of the CA 4 in Co l e v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 
(1980). Petr argues that resps did not satisfy the cause 
requirement of Wainwright because the result reached by the Ohio 
court in Robinson was not "unanticipatable" at the time of trial, 
and notes that counsel in Robin son did make the objection that 
counsel failed to make here. Petr further argues that the 
prejudice requirement of Wainwr i ght was not met here because 
assigning the defendant the bur den of proof on the issue of self-
defense is not in itself uncons t itutional. (The Ohio law prior 
to its change in 1974 was not unconstitutional.) The CA 6 
avoided this problem by effectively rewriting the Ohio statute: 
it held that the enactment of § 2901.05 in 1974 created a 
I 
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functional element of t~e crime of "absence of the affirmative 
defense." Under Ohio law, however, the existence or nonexistence 
of the affirmative defense is collateral to the elements of the 
crime. See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 (1973). Thus, the 
CA 6 found prejudice in the failure of the state courts to apply 
a state statutory benefit and this reflects a misperception of 
the role of the federal courts upon habeas review. 
Resp Bell argues that the en bane decision was not as 
fragmented as it seems at first. No member of the court denied 
that the state had erred in making defendants prove their 
innocence by establishing that they acted in self-defense; seven 
judges found that the misallocation of the burden of proof was an 
error of constitutional magnitude; and six judges found that the 
standard set forth in Wainwright was met. Furthermore, Ohio law 
on the issue of the burden of proof with respect to affirmative 
defenses has been so confused and inconsistent that the present 
case is particularly unsuited for review by this Court. This 
case is distinguishable from the CA 4 decision in Cole on two 
grounds. First, the benefit claimed in fole derived directly 
from this Court's prior pronouncements on the constitutional 
requirement of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it was 
not tainted by any inconsistent or contradictory actions by the 
state legislature and courts. Second, to the extent that there 
was confusion on the meaning of the federal constitutional 
standard, the state here, unlike ih Cole, was itself the cause of 
that confusion. Finally, the decision below is of limited 
-·8-
precedential value because it relies heavily upon the unique 
circumstances of Ohio law, and applies to only a narrow category 
of cases tried between 1974 and 1978. 
Resp Hughes has filed a separate response, which adopts the 
substantive reasoning presented in that of Bell. Hughes points 
out that both he and Isaac have received a final release 
{termination) of their parole from the State of Ohio. This 
means, that as far as the State of Ohio is concerned, both have 
fully served their entire sentences. The petr here is the 
superintendent of the correctional facility where Isaac and 
Hughes had been held. He was named as the party defendant by 
virtue of the fact that he was the individual who held custody of 
Hughes and Isaac when the habeas corpus petition was filed. 
Since his sole interest in this proceeding stemmed from the fact 
that he was the custodian and since his custodial interest has 
terminated independently of these proceedings, he no longer has a 
concrete interest in the cases against Isaac and Hughes. 
Resp Isaac has filed a separate response, which is not very 
clear. He appears to take the approach accepted by the CA 6 
panel, concentrating on the Due Process implications of limited 
retroactivity. 
5. DISCUSSION: Resp Hughes seems correct in pointing out 
an initial problem as to whether or not there is still a live 
controversy between petr and re s ps Hughes and Isaac. The 
petition is not altogether clear, but it does state that "Hughes 
and Isaac were granted final relea~es as a matter of parole and -
thus have served their sentence s ." Although the collateral 
-9-
consequences of a conviction would keep the matter alive had 
resps lost below, it is not at all clear that petr, 
superintendent of the correctional institute, is any longer the 
proper party to represent the state's continuing interest or that 
a habeas proceeding is the proper forum for this. However, 
because the petition refers to parole, it is not clear that 
parole could not still be revoked. (Although the reference to 
"final releases" indica'tes that it could not.) Because of this 
I 
confusion as to the status of the case with respect to Isaac and 
Hughes, I recommend that if the Court grants this case it take 
one of two approaches. First, it could grant the petition 
limited to the Bell case and hold the other two. Second, it 
could ask for further bri~fing on the potential mootness point 
' prior to granting. I would recommend the first approach as the 
simplest. ~  
Both of the issues raised by the cert petition are 
important. There is a conflict with the en bane decision of the 
CA 4 on the question of whether a change in the law can satisfy 
----~---------------
the "cau3.e" requirement of Wainwright. The CA 4 seems to have --
believed it was bound by the footnote in Hankerson: 
"If change of law is cause for failing to object, 
then no state proce~ural ~ar could prevent 
federal habeas corpus in the context of cases 
held to be retroactive,· and the Supreme Court's 
reliance on procedural bar as a reason for 
extending Mullanet _ietroactively would be 
circumvented. Footnote 8 cl~arly implies that 
the Court feeis that cna nge of law is not cause 
under Wainwright." ~ 
620 F.2d at 1063. 
I don't read the language of the Hankerson footnote to have 
definitively settled the issue. It says only that "the states . 
-10-
•• may be able to insulate past convictions by forcing the 
normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury 
instruction is a waiver of any claim." Since a conflict has 
developed in the circuits over this issue, it may be appropriate 
for the Court to decide the point left open in Hankerson. 
The second question raised by the petition, whether there 
was prejudice, also raises an ~nteresting question. I read the 
plurality opinion below, which is the ~ajority QQinion in Bell, .....-------
to hold that by assuming the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt \~ith respect to the absence of self-defense, the state has 
effectively defined the absence of self-defense as as element of 
crime. At least there is no constitutional distinction between a 
statute which laid out the elements of the offense to include the 
absence of self-defense and a separate statute which although 
speaking of self-defense as an "affirmative defense" puts the 
burden on the state to prove its absence. This combination of 
the reasonable doubt standard with what appears to be an 
affirmative defense puts the case somewhere between Mulla ney and 
Patterson. It may, therfore, be a good vehicle by which the 
Court could clarify the tension between those two cases that has 
troubled the lower courts. 
My recommendation then is that the Court consider a 
grant on both issues, but consider limiting the grant to the Bell 
case alone. 
There are three responses. 
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~fl J~/1/~t - ~~--· ~. 
No. 80-1430: Engle v. Isaac; Perini v. Bell; Engle v. Hughes 
(1,_:4/.J~ ~ ~~~;; ~
~~ )
Question Presented 
Whether in the circumstances of this case there was 
"cause and prejudice" permitting federal habeas review despite .. .. . ... 
the defendant's failure · to obey a state contemporaneous 
2. 
In 1975 Isaac was convicted in Ohio state court of 
one count of aggravated assault. At trial, Isaac relied on a 
defense of self-defense, and the trial judge instructed the 
jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving his 
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This 
was the standard jury charge on self-defense at that time, and 
~saac made no objecti~ /h;!J ~~ 
Prior to 1974, Ohio followed the traditional common 
law rule that both the burden of going forward and of proving 
affirmative defenses rested on the defendant. In that year, 
however, the Ohio legislature undertook to codify the burden 
of proving affirmative defenses as follows: 
(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the 
prosecution. The burden of going forward with the 
evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the 
accused. § 2901.05(A). 
Initially, this codification was not thought to have worked 
any change in the law. However, after Isaac was convicted but 
before he had taken an appeal, the State Supreme Court held 
that the codification had in fact changed the burden of proof ~ 
effective January 1, 1974. The court held that it was now the s;f~(: 
ldR state's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the~ 
absence of an affirmative defense, once properly raised. ~ 








In his appeal, Isaac relied upon Robinson to attack 
the jury instructions. Citing Isaac's failure to object at 
trial, the intermediate court of appeals affirmed his 
conviction. The State Supreme Court dismissed his appeal in 
1977 for lack of a substantial question. On the same day that 
it dismissed Isaac's appeal, the state Supreme Court held that 
its decision in Robinson was applicable retroactively to all 
trials held after January 1, 1974, but only if the defendant 
objected to the instructions at the time of trial. 
Isaac then applied for federal habeas relief, arguing that the 
State's refusal to grant him the benefit of the Robinson 
decision violated due process. The district court held that 
Isaac had waived his constitutional claim by failing to 
present it at trial. Ohio Criminal Rule 30 requires a 
defendant to object to jury instructions before the jury 
~ rrr 
retires. As such, the State court's rejection of his appeal~ 
~~ 
rested on an independent state procedural ground, and Isaac 
had shown neither cause nor actual prejudice necessary to 
permit the court to hear his federal claim despite his 
procedural default. 
A panel of the CA6 reversed (Celebreeze, Phillips 
and Peck). As a preliminary matter, Judge Peck nQt~d that the 
CA did not need to decide whether the State court's decision 
to apply Robinson retroactively as a matter of state law would 
have been required under Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 
(1975) and Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 u.s. 233 (1977). 
·, 
4. 
Turning to the merits, the 
~ 
CA held that the cause and 
-1 
prejudice standard was simply irrelevant to Isaac's attack on 
the selective retroactive application of Robinson. To the 
extent that Isaac challenged the jury instructions at trial 
the cause and prejudice standard might block his claim. But 
Isaac's major claim was not that the jury instructions were ..__ .--
unconstitutional but that a selective retroactive application 
I '-\ 
of Robinson itself violated due process. The purposes of the 
contemporaneous objection rule were not served in this case--
Isaac had no reason to suspect that the instructions were not 
valid. To bar Isaac from ·' benefit of Robinson on the basis 
that he failed to lodge an objection was an arbitrary and 
capricious exercise of state procedural law. Judge Celebrezze 
filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that it was 
irrelevant whether Isaac should have objected or not: Having 
agreed to assume the burden of proof after January 1, 197 4, 
and considering the fundamental nature of the burden of proof 
to the truth finding process, the State must adhere to its own 
procedures. 
The CA en bane affirmed but on a different ground. 
The CA was no longer content to argue that the selective~ 
application of a retroactive rule of state law was arbitrary 
and capricious. Footnote 8 in Hankerson, casts doubt on such 
a holding and requires more deference to state procedural 
. 
rules. Rather, "the more appropriate focus is on the 
J 






the jury at Isaac's trial In this 
context,~~ threshold question, then, is not whether the 
state's limiting of the retroactive benefits of a new 
statutory interpretation through the use of a procedural rule 
is constitutional but whether that state procedural rule -
effectively ~eludes federal habeas corpus review of the 
underlying constitutional claim." 
To measure the effect of the procedural rule, the CA (?~ ~ 
applied the "cause and prejudice" rule stated in wainwright v. ~ 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) • Because there was no indication d 
at the time of Isaac's trial that the jury instruction given-~ "" 
by the trial court was contrary to state law, it would ha~ 
been futile for Isaac to object. A defendant should not be J J~ • ./J · 
required to anticipate changes in the law, and Isaac's failure ' 
~------~~--~----~----------
to object was supported by "cause." Moreover, the prejudice ~ 
to Isaac was clear since he was forced to bear the 
proving self defense. The prejudice in such a case 
presumed. 





Confident that it could reach Isaac's attack on the~ 
jury instructions, the CA then considered whether that attack 
raised a question of federal law. In In re Winship, 397 u.s. 
358 (1970), and Mullaney' v. Wilbur, 421 u.s. 684 (1975), the 
Court held that the state could not place the burden of 
proving an element of the crime on the defendant. Although 
-
the Court had limited Mullaney somewhat in Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) , "due process requires that a state 
6. 
prove all elements of the crime as the state has defined the 
crime." 
Isaac was convicted of aggravated assault. The 
affirmative defense of self-defense did ~t negate an element 
of__ this crim~. 
and Patterson: 
Even so, the question arises under Mullaney 
"Can Ohio, having by statute assumed the 
burden of proof with respect to absence of self-defense, 
consistently with due process convict a defendant by applying 
a different and lesser standard of proof"? The CA answered 
the question in the negative: Once the State chose to assume 
the burden of proof, fundamental fairness required that it be 
bound by that decision. "From the point of view of fairness 
and due process, there is no practical difference between 
requiring a state to prove the elements of crimes beyond a 
reasonable doubt and requiring it to meet its assumed burden 
of proving absence of affirmatite defenses beyond a reasonable 
doubt." The habeas petition was granted. 
There were several concurring and dissenting 
opinions. Chief Judge Edwards argued that under Mullaney and 
Hankerson the burden of proving self defense could not rest on 
the defendant, regardless of state law. He joined the 
majority's treatment of the cause and prejudice question. 
Judge Jones concurred in the result only. 
In a rather opaque dissent, Judge Lively argued that 
there was no federal constitutional violation in Isaac's 
conviction. All that the State had done in the new statute as 
7. 
interpreted by the State court was to reduce the quantum of 
proof needed to permit an acquittal on the ground of self-
defense. Quite simply, the defendant no longer need prove 
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, but must 
simply put in enough evidence to raise the defense~ the 
statute said no more than that. The State had not made "a 
determination that absence of the facts necessary to sustain a 
plea of self-defense 1 must be either proved or presumed. 1 " 
There had been no change in the elements of the offense. Nor 
was there any constitutional requirement that the State make 
its rule retroactive in all instances. Judge Engel joined in 
this dissent. 
Judge Kennedy argued that there had been no showing 
~
of "cause and prejudice." In Hankerson, 432 U.S., at 244 n.8, 
the Court expressly noted that by holding Mullaney to be 
retroactive the Court was not subjecting the States to the 
burden of re-trying every defendant: "The States, if they 
wish, may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing 
the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury 
instruction is a waiver of any claim of error." The clear 
implication of this statement is that a mere change in law is 
not "cause." Moreover, it was not impossible for Isaac to 
have anticipated the change in law: Mullaney was decided 
three months before his trial and In re Winship five years 
prior. He might well have objected to the instructions on the 
basis of these cases. 
J 
8. 
After noting his belief that due process requires 
the State to bear the burden of negating self defense as an 
element of the offense, Judge Merritt dissented for the 
reasons given by Judge Kennedy. 
Hughes and Bell were decided on the authority of 
Isaac. 
Note that Hughes and Isaac have been granted final 
releases as a matter of parole. Bell is still in prison. The 
parties do not address the question of mootness in the case of 
Hughes and Isaac. 
T~ 4)5 ·. 




There are two questions in this case. Th
question is wheth.er these defendants a~~~king a ~ 
~ ~ 
collateral attack on the jury instructions by their failure
2
to 
~-~ ... ~, 
comply with Ohio's contemporaneous o~jection rule. These cases 
provide the Court with an opportunity to explain the meaning 
of the "cause and prejudice" test stated but not defined in 
Wainwright v. Sykes. In particular, these cases permit the 
Court to decide whether the assumed futility of an objection--
or the fact that a legal basis for an objection does not yet 
exist--is "cause" for failing to object. ~' there is 
considerable uncertainty in these cases as to whether any 
federal constitutional violation ever existed. It is unclear 
that the change in state law and the State's decision to limit 
a.cyues that the CA6 has virtually destroyed the "cause" 
requirement as stated by the Court i n Wainwright v. Sykes. 
Although the Sykes Court did not attempt to give precise 
definition to the terms "cause d an prejudiced," it made clear 
that the "deliberate bypass" or "knowing waiver" tests stated 
in Fay v. Noia no longer governed. If a belief that an 
objection will be futile or if failure to anticipate a change 
in the law are sufficient t h o s ow cause, then there is little 
difference between "cause" d "d · an el1berate bypass." 
Our system guarantees all d f d e en ants competent 
counsel. But it does not guarantee all ~aFanA~-•-
After noting his belief that due process requires 
the State to bear the burden of negating self defense as an 
element of the offense, Judge Merritt dissented for the 
reasons given by Judge Kennedy. 
Hughes and Bell were decided on the authority of 
Isaac. 
Note that Hughes and Isaac have been granted final 
releases as a matter of parole. Bell is still in prison. The 
parties do not address the question of mootness in the case of 
Hughes and Isaac. 
TU)-() c:P:> ·. 




There are two questions in this case. Th~ 
question is whether these defendants a~~~king a ~ 
~ ~~ 




comply with Ohio's contemporaneous o~jection rule. These cases 
provide the Court with an opportunity to explain the meaning 
of the "cause and prejudice" test stated but not defined in 
Wainwright v. Sykes. In particular, these cases permit the 
Court to decide whether the assumed futility of an objection--
or the fact that a legal basis for an objection does not yet 
exist--is "cause" for failing to object. ~, there is 
considerable uncertainty in these cases as to whether any 
federal constitutional violation ever existed. It is unclear 
that the change in state law and the State's decision to limit 
.. 
,.· 
the retroactive effect of the change implicated any federal 
constitutional rights. Thus, even if cause and prejudice .__ 
could be shown, it is unclear that any basis for habeas relief 
---~ 
exists. To make matters more confusing, the State has framed 
'--
this substantive constitutional question--going to the merits 
of the habeas petition--as if it were part of the initial 
"cause and prejudice" analysis: Whether "prejudice" has been 
shown, when the habeas petitioner has failed to allege a 
violation of his federal constitutional rights. 
A. Cause 
Both the State and the SG argue with some force that 
the CA has misconstrued the "cause" requirement. The State 
argues that the CA6 has virtually destroyed the "cause" 
requirement as stated by the Court in Wainwright v. Sykes. 
Although the Sykes Court did not attempt to give precise 
definition to the terms "cause and prejudiced," it made clear 
that the "deliberate bypass" or "knowing waiver" tests stated 
in Fay v. Noia no longer governed. If a belief that an 
objection will be futile or if failure to anticipate a change 
in the law are sufficient to show cause, then there is little 
difference between "cause" and "deliberate bypass." 
Our system guarantees all defendants competent 
counsel. But it does not guarantee all defendants counsel of 
equal competence. Some lawyers will have greater foresight 
and will anticipate changes in the law. Indeed, by their 
objections they will often cause changes in the law to be 
made, to the benefit of the system. Attorneys should have an 
incentive to change the law and anticipate developments. In 
the circumstances of this case, and particularly in view of 
the fact that Mullaney was decided before trial while all 
counsel realized that the Ohio criminal law had been 
recodified, there was no reason why Isaac's attorney should 
not have objected to the jury instructions. These 
circumstances distinguish O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 u.s. 92 
(1966) , in which the Court held that a contemporaneous 
objection rule could not bar relief for an antecedent 
violation of Griffin v. California, 380 u.s. 609 (1965). 
Moreover, if the notion of finality is to have any 
place in the criminal system, the states must be permitted to 
insist upon their contemporaneous o6~~ction rules. The 
Hankerson Court recognized this in footnote 8 in which it 
noted that although Mullaney would be applied retroactively, 
failure to object at trial would bar retrial if the state had 
a contemporaneous objection rule. 
The SG, as amicus, agrees with the State that the -CA6 has left little to the cause requirement. The SG re-
emphasizes the important policies served by contemporaneous 
objection rules: such rules promote finality and the 
avoidance of error while they discourage sandbagging by 




policies be overborne. Yet the CA did not explain why the 
apparent futility of an objection ought to amount to cause. 
If "cause" exists when an attorney simply inadvertently fails 
to make an objection, then "cause" and "deliberate bypass" are 
identical. Nor should "cause" exist when an attorney 
deliberately decides not to object because the objection will 
probably be futile. Such a decision is a tactical decision--
to make some claims, but not others--no different than any 
other tactical decision. If the tactic does not pay off, that 
is the price of an adversary system. But the defendant cannot 
have it both ways. He cannot withhold his objection because 
he believes that to be the more effective way to present his 
case, and then complain when he loses. Only when a defendant 
"has been denied a fair opportunity to raise his claim in 
accordance with the governing procedural rules" should there 
be a finding of "cause" sufficient to excuse a procedural 
default. 
requirement is in no sense unfair. A defendant has no 
caus~ 
right 
The SG emphasizes that his view of the 
to have his claims at trial considered in light of subsequent 
legal developments. The system aims at fa1rness not 
) --perfection. The system simply could not operate if every 
change in the law would require retrial of those convicted 
under the old law. Were "f~tility" sufficient to show cause, 
there would be little incentive for lawyers to anticipate 
changes or make new claims, and sandbagging would be 
encouraged. 
Finally, the SG agrees with the State that even if 
futility is sufficient "cause," there was no such futility in 
the circumstances of this case. The result in Robinson was 
fully to be anticipated given the amendment to Ohio law. 
Indeed, the result in Robinson suggests that objection would 
not have been futile. 
The SG notes in a footnote that he is unsure 
whether the "prejudice" component of the "cause and prejudice" 
test is before the Court given the manner in which the State 
framed the prejudice question. If the proper definition of 
the "prejudice" prong is before the Court, then the SG wishes 
it to be known that it was not properly applied in these 
cases. The CA presumed prejudice. But the test of prejudice 
is actual prejudice, and having found cause the CA should have 
remanded to the trial court to assess whether a different jury 
instruction would have made any difference in the 
circumstances of these cases. 
Although I find these arguments to be somewhat 
persuasive, I . s . d rema1n unconv1nce that a demanding "cause" 
requirement would promote the purposes of the contemporaneous 
objection rule. This is a point which is often made in the 
secondary literature. One frequently encounters Justice 
Brennan's argument that most violations of states' 
contemporaneous objection rules will occur due to attorney 
. 
' 




inadvertence not to "sandbagging." See 91 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 
217-218: 
"There is good reason to believe that sandbagging 
is not often a useful tactic, and that in any event 
federal courts are sufficiently able to deter it. 
The most likely explanation for procedural defaults, 
then, is attorney error. If a lawyer's default 
results from inadvertence, the Sykes rule will not 
increase the chance that the objection will be 
raised in the state trial. Thus, the choice between 
~and Sykes is neutral with respect to the goals 
~ promoting determinations based on 'fresh 
evidence' and deciding all issues in one proceeding. 
Finally, it seems unwarranted to presume that state 
judges will ignore their own contemporaneous 
objection rules." 
The Harvard article suggests that a "reasonable attorney" W d.--t 
standard be adopted: "the court can examine the trial recor~ 
to see whether there was in fact a deliberate bypass and, ~~~ 
not, whether it is more likely than not that a reasonable~ / 
defense attorney would have considered the constitutional~~ 
~5 
.::.F...;;e...;;d;_:e...;;r;_;a;:.:l=----=H.=.:a;:.:b=-e=-a=s __ c.::.o.::..::.r..._p~u...;;s _ ___;;ca;.:.;n;_;.;_~ 
objection and decided not to raise it." 
See also, Tague, 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 31 Stan.L.Rev. 1 (1978): 
"If Estelle and Sykes illustrate the 
defendant's burden, few defendants will be able to 
establish cause. If the attorney exercises 
professional judgment, perhaps simply if the 
attorney consciously decides not t9 object, the 
defendant will be·barred from habeas relief. It is 
not enough for the defendant to show that counsel 
failed to research or to understand the law, or 
objected o-n the wrong ground, or failed to get a 
ruling on the objection from the trial court, or 
failed to · discover the information upon which the 
objection was based in time to comply with the 
procedural rule. It is not enough for the defendant 
to show that counsel wrongly decided that the motion 
would be denied, or that counsel was not motivated 
by either the hope of gaining some tactical 
advantage or of avoiding some possible harm, or that 
the defendant disagreed with counsel's decision. And 
there is no suggestion that the habeas court 
must review the reasonableness of the attorney's 
decision. Finally, it is not enough to show that 
counsel did not know of the information that would 
have supported an objection, at least if this 
infomration was reasonably discoverable. 
There are, however, several ways the 
defendant might establish cause. First, if counsel 
did object, albeit out-of-time, the defendant could 
show that counsel's failure to strictly comply with 
the procedural rule was inadvertentand not 
deliberate. Second, the defendant could show that 
the attorney did not actually decide to refrain from 
objecting: Counsel might have lacked the competence 
to recognize the issue~ the practice challenged on 
post-conviction appeal may have been so customary in 
the jurisdiction that a reasonable trial attorney 
might not have objected~ the government may have 
failed to reveal information that would have alerted 
counsel to the issue~ or the legal basis for the 
objection may have been discovered or even created 
only after the time for objection had passed but 
before the conviction became final. Third, the 
defendant might show cause if the attorney decided 
not to object because objecting might have had 
'grisly' results for the defendant, or because 
counsel reasonably feared that the trial court or 
jury might retaliate against the defendant in 
response to the objection. Finally, the defendant 
might also show that no attorney would ever have 
made a tactical decision to refrain from objecting--
that any attorney who had recognized the possiblity 
of an objection would have made one." (emphasis 
added} 
14. 
I think the argument is fairly convincing that an LJ 5 
exacting cause standard does not serve the purposes of ~ --
contemporaneous objection rules. It is scarcely believable~ 
~
that any of the defendants in these cases were sandbagging~~ 






not yet altered its position. However else one would apply 
the cause requirement in another case, it is di ff icul t to 
characterize a decision not to object in these cases as a 
tactical decision. 
I think you have found two more sensible ways of ~ . 
limiting the burden of federal habeas. In your '!i"ankerson 
~ 
concurrence you argue that new federal constitutional _1;ules 
([) 
should not be applied retroactively in habeas proceedings. 
Presumably that would knock out quite a few habeas cases. And 
in ~ne v. Powell, you succeeded in ending the collateral V 
review of search and seizure decisions where there had been a 
full and fair consideration of the question in state court. 
Unfortunately, you were less successful in Rose v. Mitchell. ~ 
I think that these approaches are more analytically satisfying 
than an artificially high "cause" standard. The question for ~ 
you, and I think it is difficult, is whether you should go 
along with a higher ' bause ~ standard in light of the Court's 
apparent unwillingness to place further substantive limits on 
the availability of habeas or to place a flat limit on the ? 
retroactive application of new constitutional rules in 5 
collateral proceedings. The difficulty with an "insurmountable 
cause" approach is illustrated in these cases. If there has 
been a violation of constitutional rights in this case, it is 
the right to be tried under the state prescribed burden 
proof. Such a right appears to go to the basic 





will keep these defendants from habeas relief, but if their/ 
constitutional claims are valid, I question whether they ~ 
should not be able to present their claims upon habeas. 
This is not to say that procedural defaults will be 
forgiven in any instance. Perhaps one might adopt the 'Jt.o 
"reasonable attorney" approach--would a reasonable attorney 
have been aware of the objection and decided not to make it 
for tactical reasons? There may be cases in which the failure 
to object is inexcusable and where the objection deals with a 
"trial type" right rather than a right whose infringement 
questions the basic fairness of the proceedings. Thus, in 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) , the defendant was 
tried for assault with intent to commit murder in Texas state 
court. He was tried in prison garb; his attorney did not 
object. However, ~exas has no contemporaneous objection rule. 
The USDC rejected Williams' §2254 petition; the CA reversed. 
Although there was no violation of a contemporaneous objection 
rule, the Chi"ef reasoned that only if Williams was compelled 
to wear prison garb was there a constitutional violation. 
Having framed the issue in this way, the Chief's analysis of 
c.J2S 
the indicia of compulsion _.XS strikingly similar to a "cause 
and prejudice" sort of analysis. Because Williams had not 
objected, because the record indicated that such an objection 
would not have been futile, and because the record did not 
indicate that Willaims' counsel had anything to fear from any 
objection, it could not be said that Willaims had been 
17. 
"compelled" to stand trial in jail garb or "that there was 
sufficient reason to excuse the failure to raise the issue 
before trial." 
In 
~ £,__ k.UJ_ v LU~ j -concurring ~ noted that there were two 
.1\ 
situations in which a , conviction should be left standing 
despite an infringement of a constitutional right: (1} 
knowing waiver of the right and (2} "inexcusable procedural 
default." This was a case of inexcusable default: "It is my 
view that a tactical choice or procedural default of the 
nature of that involved here ordinarily should operate, as a 
matter of federal law, to preclude the later raising of the 
substantive right." You emphasized that this was "a curable 
trial defect" and that the right at stake was "a trial-type 
right" such that the attorney's error ought to bind the client 
(citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 u.s. 443, 451-452 (1965}}. 
There was evidence in the record that the defendant had 
deliberately decided not to object because of an erroneous 
belief that the objection would be futile. 
I may be giving the lawyers in this case too much of 
the benefit of the doubt. Certainly, given the decision in 
Mullaney and the amendment to Ohio law, a good lawyer might 
have thought to make an objection in these cases. And habeas 
ought not to be the corrective for the inherent problems of an 
adversary system. But, on the whole, I would not support the 
rigid cause standard urged by the government. 
M ....... 
18. 
I will consider the constitutional question in the 
next section, but I am afraid you will have to wait until the 








Engle v. Isaac--No. 80-1430 (continued) 
B. Prejudice 
The State argues that no prejudice was shown in 
these cases because there was no constitutional violation. By 
framing the argument in this way, the State has collapsed the 
prejudice inquiry with the merits of the habeas petition. 
~~--~==~----------~~--~-------------
This is 6aly The showing of prejudice required 
to overcome a procedural default need not be the same as the 
prejudice required to show a constitutional violation. 
The CA6 found a federal constitutional violation in 
these cases upon an analogy to Mullaney and Patterson: 
As we read Mullaney and Patterson, while the 
st tes are largely free to define crimes as they 
choose, fundamental fairness and therefore due 
process re uire that they prove the elements of the 
crimes, as t e sta t:es ave c osen to de£ 1ne - them, 
beyond a ~ reasonable~. -we further conclude 
that, once a state assumed the burden of proving the 
absence of an affirmative defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, fundamental fairness and therefore 
due process require it to meet the burden that it 
chose to assume. From the point of view of fairness 
and due process, there is no practical difference 
between requiring a state to prove the elem~nts of 
cr1mes beyond a reasonabre doubt and requ1ring-lt to 
meet its assumed bur en of proving absence - of 
affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Thus we conclude that, in Isaac's trial, placing the 
burden on him to prove self-defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence constituted a denial 
of federal due process." 
19. 
It is important to note just what the CA6 is not 
holding. First, it is not holding that the State must assume 
the burden of defeating affirmative offenses. Such a holding 
would not be justified in light of Patterson, although two of 
the concurring judges apparently felt that the change in Ohio 
c~~:. 
law was required by Mullaney and Patterson. Rather, it ~ 
8.~Y t!!!,.t @ and as a matter of state law, Ohio chooses to 
assume that burden, then it must bear it as a matter of ............................... -
federal due process. One can draw a rather strong analogy to 
Mullaney: Due process did not require Maine to include an 
absence of provocation and passion in its definition of the 
crime of murder: once the State did so, however, due process 
requires the state to bear the burden of disproving 
provocation and passion. 
Second, the CA did not hold that the State court's 
decision in Robinson had to be applied retroactively in all 
cases as a matter of federal constitutional law. That was the 
approach taken by the panel in the first decision. Judge Peck 
argued that it was arbitrary and capricious to insist upon the 
contemporaneous objection rule and that Robinson must apply to 
all tried after January 1, 1974. But the CA en bane opinion 




relied solely on the fact that the statute changed the law as 
of January 1, 1974. Robinson was of value to the CA because 
it interpreted the statute. But the source of the 
$ t4.(t. (.0CA-r t,. ~ 
constitutional violation was not the ~ decision to apply 
Robinson retroactively in some cases but not others~ rather, 
the source of the constitutional violation was the State's 
decision to assume the burden of disproving affirmative 
defenses as of January 1, 1974. Had the CA based its finding 
of a constitutional violation on the state court's decision to 
apply Robinson retroactively in only some cases, then I think 
we would have a problem with the CA's decision. That is, if 
the State only assumed the burden of disproving affirmative 
defenses by its decision in Robinson, then surely the State 
could limit the retroactive application of that decision. 
Your concurrence in Hankerson suggests the propriety of such 
limitations. 
Judge Lively argues in dissent that in fact the 
State did not assume the burden of disproving affirmative 
defenses. The State simply removed the burden from the 
defendant. It did not reassign the burden to the State. This 
is a clever argument, but I doubt it makes much difference. I 
would think that Mullaney would govern a case in which a 
defendant was forced to bear the burden of proving a defense 




Finally, it m kes one's head s in to consider~ 
precisely how your Hankerson concurrence would apply if the 
Court affirms the CA6. The Court will hold that once a State 
has assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses, or 
once Ohio has removed the burden of proof from the defendant, 
it must adhere to that allocation of the burden or violate due 
process. Such a holding would be something of an extension 
of Mullaney, and I think you could take the position that the 
rule should only be available to defendants on direct appeal. 
Would that mean that other defendants tried under the old 
instructions in Ohio, after 1974, could not raise the claim 
upon habeas? That would seem to be a strange result given 
that these cases come to the Court in a collateral posture 
themselves. Now that Ohio has returned--as of 11/1/78--to its 
old rule, and now clearly places the burden on the defendant · -
once again, the retroactivity question will only be important 
to a band of defendants tried between 1974 and 1978. 
III. Conclusion 
Much to my surprise, I would affirm the CA6. I 
think that there are more careful ways of limiting habeas than 
by insisting on a standard of cause that is virtually 
impossible for any defendant to meet. Your approach in 
Hankerson and Stone v. Powell points the way. As to the 







convincing argument, on an analogy to Mullaney, that once the 
State altered the burden of proof it was bound to adhere to 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Engle v. Isaac--No. 80-1430 
events: 
I. These are the relevant, underlying state law 
1. Prior to 1974, Ohio followed the traditional common 
------law rule placing the burden of proof as to affirmative defenses 
on the defendant. 
2. Effective January 1, 1974, Ohio passed a new 
criminal code that included the following provision: 
(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The 
burden of going forward with the evidence of an 
affirmative defense is upon the accused. 
Note that the statute says nothing as to the burden of proof. 
3. In a 1975 decision, State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St.2d 
28 (1975), the Ohio S.C. stated in dictum that the defendant must sr;N -
bear the burden of proving affirmative defenses under the new 
statutory section. 
4. But in a 1976 decision, State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio 
St.2d 103 (1976), the Ohio SC changed course and held that the 
affirmative 
defenses, placing that burden on the prosecution. The defendant 
bears only the burden of going forward. The court held that a 
jury instruction placing the burden of proof on the defendant was 
prejudicial error. 
5. In State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95 (1977), the 
Ohio S.C. made clear that its ruling in Robinson w~ only apply 
~ctive~ to those defendants who objected at trial in accord 
with Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule pertaining to jury 
instructions. (Rule 30). At the same time, the S.C. held that a 
defendant tried to a judge, could claim benefit of the Robinson 
decision since there was no comparable contemporaneous objection 
rule in the context of bench trials--the judge does not instruct 
himself. 
foo 1::: beH ./:-
6. The Ohio legislature hiP.!" now -take~ matters into its /\ ~----~A~-------
hands. Effective January 1, 1978, defendants must again bear the - --burden of proving affirmative defenses: 
"The burden of going forward with the evidence of an 
affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative 
defense, is upon the accused. 
II. The decisions below 
Because Isaac did not object to the jury instruction he 
was barred from all state court relief under Humphries. 
The federal district court held that Isaac's failure to 
object constituted a waiver of his claim upon Mullaney that the 
erroneous jury instructions violated due process. Without 
reaching the validity of Isaac's constitutional theory, the court 
dismissed because of Isaac's failure to show "cause and 
prejudice." 
A panel of the CA6 reversed. The panel held that the 
district court had properly barred Isaac from attacking the jury 
instructions on the basis of cause and prejudice. However, Isaac 
also argued that Ohio's selective application of State v. 
Robinson was itself a constitutional violation and as to this 
allegation there was no requirement of contemporaneous 
objection.: 
"The major thrust of petitioner's claim was, and is, 
not directed to the constit~h ionality of the jury 
instruction itself; but r~~er, it centers upon and 
challenges the constitutionality of the Ohio Supreme 
Court's selective application of its State v. Robinson 
decision while petitioner's conviction was st1ll 
pending on review in the state courts. Wainwright v. 
Sykes, supra, is not applicable to this second prong of 
appellant's petition." 
Under the panel's holding, Isaac did not have a claim 
because of Mullaney. Any such claim had been forfeited by his 
failure to object. Rather he had a claim because the State's 
insistence upon its contemporaneous objection rule itself 
amounted to an independent constitutional violation. By 
permitting some defendants to be retried because they had lodged 
an objection, while defendants such as Isaac were not permitted 
retrial, was arbitrary and capricious. The panel never 
considered whether or not the jury instructions were themselves 
constitutionally permissible. 
The CA6 en bane drew back from the panel's attack on 
the contemporaneous objection rule. Recognizing that these rules 
are entitled to some deference and that the Court indicated as 
much in footnote 8 of Hankerson, the en bane court stated: "We 
are ... hesitant to hold, as did the panel opinion, that this use 
of a contemporaneous objection rule to limit the retroactive 
benefits of a new statutory interpretation is, ipso facto, 
violative of due process." Rather, the panel framed the issue as 
follows: 
"We beleive that the more appropriate focus is on the 
underlying claim, in this case the constitutional 
validity of the jury instructions given at Isaac's 
trial as considered in light of Robinson Humphries. In 
this context, the threshold question, then, is not 
whether the state's limiting of the retroactive 
benefits of a new statutory interpretation through the 
use of a procedural rule is constitutional but whether 
that state procedural rule effectively precludes 
federal habeas corpus review of the underlying 
constitutional claim." 
The en bane court found that there was cause and 
prejudice and proceeded to determine the validity of the jury 
... -
instructions. The CA noted that absence of self-defense was not 
an element of the crime of aggravated assault as defined by the 
state. Even so a Mullaney type question arose: 
"Can Ohio, having by statute assumed the burden of 
proof with respect to absence of self-defense, 
consistently with due process convict a defendant by 
applying a different and lesser standard of proof • 
•••• As we read Mullaney and Patterson, while the state 
are largely free to define crimes as they choose, 
fundamental fairness and therefore due process require 
that they prove the elements of the crimes, as the 
states have chosen to define them, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. we further conclude tht, once a state assumed 
the burden of proving the absence of an affirmative 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, fundamental fairness 
and therefore due process require it to meet the burden 
that it chose to assume. From the poin to view of 
fairness and due process, there is no practical 
difference between requiring a state to prove the 
elements of crimes beyond a reasonable doubt and 
requiring it to meet its assumed burden of proving 
absence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
In short, as I understand it, there are two ways of 
thinking about what happened here. The panel considered that the 
Robinson decision itslef created the new right in defendants to 
have the state bear the burden of disproving affirmative 
defenses. But that right was only made available, 
retrospectively, to those defendants who had the good fortune to 
object to the old instructions. The panel viewed this selective, 
retrospective provision of the right as arbitrary and a violation 
of equal protection and due process. The ~ bane cou~ on the 
other hand, considered that the new right was created by the 
-------------------
statute. The only limit on asserting the right was the state's --contemporaneous objection rule, and, if "cause and prejudice" 
could be shown, the failure to object would not bar habeas 
relief. Thus, I do not think that the state's ability to make a 
law only partially retrospective is at all implicated in the way 
that the CA en bane approached the question. But I may be wrong. 
No. 80-1430 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNIT/n STATES COURT OF ----
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[February-, 1982] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), we held that a 
state prisoner, barred by procedural default from raising a 
constitutional claim on direct appeal, could not litigate that 
claim in a§ 2254 habeas corpus1 proceeding without showing 
cause for and actual prejudice from the default. Applying 
the principle of Sykes to this case, we conclude that respon-
dents, who failed to comply with an Ohio rule mandating con-
temporaneous objections to jury instructions, may not chal-
lenge the constitutionality of those instructions in a federal 
habeas proceeding. 
I 
Respondents' claims rest in part on recent changes in Ohio 
criminal law. For over a century, the Ohio courts required 
criminal defendants to carry the burden of proving self-de-
' Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) empowers "[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice 
thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court" to "entertain an application for 
a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." This 
statutory remedy may not be identical in all respects to the common-law 
writ of habeas corpus. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78 (1977). 
... 
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fense by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. 
Seliskar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 95, 298 N. E. 2d 582 (1973); Szalkai 
v. State, 96 Ohio St. 36, 117 N. E. 12 (1917); Silvus v. State, 
22 Ohio St. 90 (1871). A new criminal code, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1974, subjected all affirmative defenses to the follow-
ing rule: 
"Every person accused of an offense is presumed inno-
cent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The bur-
den of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative 
defense is upon the accused." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2901.05(A) (1975). 
For more than two years after its enactment, most Ohio 
courts assumed that this section worked no change in Ohio's 
traditional burden-of-proof rules. 2 In 1976, however, the 
Ohio Supreme Court construed the statute to place only the 
burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, on the 
defendant. Once the defendant produces some evidence of 
self-defense, the state court ruled, the prosecutor must dis-
prove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rob-
inson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976) (syllabus by 
the court). 3 The present actions arose because Ohio tried 
' See, e. g., State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 30, 330 N. E. 2d 674, 676 
· (1975) (noting that "self-defense is. an affirmative defense, which must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence"), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 
1061 (1976). But see State v. Matthews , No. 74AP-428, p. 9 (Ct. App. 
Franklin County, Ohio, Dec. 24, 1974) (§ 2901.05(A) "evinces a legislative 
intent to change the burden of the defendant with respect to affirmative 
defenses"); 1 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal Law and Practice 
§ 2901.05, p. 14 (1974 eel.) ("The provisions of 2901.05(A) follow the modern 
statutory trend in this area, requiring the accused to raise the affirmative 
defense, but leaving the burden of persuasion upon the prosecution."); Stu-
dent Symposium: The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code-Reform and Regres-
sion, 33 Ohio St. L. J. 351, 420 (1972) (suggesting that legislators intended 
to change traditional rule). 
3 In Ohio, the court's syllabus contains the controlling law. See Haas 
'' 
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and convicted respondents after the effective date of 
§ 2901.05(A), but before the Ohio Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of that statute in Robinson. 4 
On~er 16, 1974, an Ohio grand jury indicted respon-
dent ughe for aggravated murder. 5 At trial the State 
show at, in the presence of seven witnesses, Hughes 
shot and killed a man who was keeping company with his for-
mer girlfriend. Prosecution witnesses testified that the vic-
tim was unarmed and had just attempted to shake hands with 
Hughes. Hughes, however, claimed that he acted in self-de-
fense. His testimony suggested that he feared the victim, a 
larger man, because he had touched his pocket while ap-
proaching Hughes. The trial court instructed the jury that 
Hughes bore the burden of proving this defense by a prepon-
v. State, 103 Ohio St. 1, 7-8, 132 N. E. 158, 159-160 (1921). 
'Two years after Robinson, the Ohio legislature once again amended 
Ohio's burden of proof law. The new§ 2901.05(A), effective November 1, 
1978, provides: 
"Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements 
of the offense is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with 
the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of pmof, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the ac-
cused." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (Supp. 1980) (emphasis 
added). 
This amendment has no effect on the litigation before us. Thoughout this 
opinion, citations to§ 2901.05(A) refer to the statute in effect between Jan-
uary 1, 1974, and October 31, 1978. 
; See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01 (1975): 
"(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, 
cause the death of another. 
"(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while commit-
ting or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after commit-
ting or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape , aggravated arson or arson, 
aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or 
escape. 
"(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated murder, and 
shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code." 
'· 
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derance of the evidence. Counsel for Hughes did not specifi-
cally object to this instruction. 6 
On January 24, 1975, the jury convicted Hughes of volun-
tary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of aggravated 
murder. 7 On September 24, 1975, the Summit County 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and on March 19, 
1976, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Hughes' appeal, 
finding no substantial constitutional question. 8 Neither of 1 
these ap eals challen ed ·ury instruction on self-defense. 
Ohio tne respon t e r aggravated mur 1 pril 
1975. Evidence at t wed that Bell was one of a group 
of bartenders who had agreed to help one another if trouble 
developed at any of their bars. On the evening of the mur-
der, one of the bartenders called Bell and told him that he 
feared trouble from five men who had entered his bar. 
When Bell arrived at the bar, the bartender informed him 
that the men had left. Bell pursued them and gunned one of 
the men down in the street. 
Bell defended on the ground that he had acted in self-de-
6 Hughes' counsel did register a general objection "to the entire Charge 
in its entirety" because "[ w ]e are operating now under a new code in which 
many things are uncertain." App. 48. Counsel's subsequent remarks, 
however, demonstrated that his objection concerned only the proposed def-
initions of "Aggravated Murder, Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter." 
.. App. 48, 50. . . 
. . 'Voluntary manslaughter. is "kriowi~gly caus[ing] the death of another" 
while under "extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provocation 
reasonably sufficient to incite [the Defendant] into using deadly force." 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.03 (A) (1975). 
Hughes was sentenced to 6-25 years in prison. The State's petition for 
certiorari indicated that Hughes has been "granted final releas[e] as a mat-
ter of parole." Pet. for Cert. 6. This release does not moot the contro-
versy between Hughes and the State. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 
504, 506-507 n. 2 (1972); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 237-240 
(1968). 
~ see State v. Hughes , C. A. No. 7717 (Ct. App. Summit County, Ohio, 
Sept. 24, 1975); State v. Hughes, No. 75-1026 (Ohio, March 19, 1976). 
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fense. He testified that as he approached two of the men, 
the bartender shouted: "He's got a gun" or "Watch out, he's 
got a gun." At this warning, Bell started shooting. As in 
Hughes' case, the trial court instructed the jury that Bell had 
the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Bell did not object to this instruction and the jury 
convicted him of murder, a lesser included offense of the 
charged crime. 9 
Bell appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, 
but failed to challenge the instruction assigning him the bur-
den of proving self-defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
Bell's conviction on April 8, 1976. 10 Bell appealed further to 
the Ohio Supreme Court, again neglecting to challenge the 
self-defense instruction. That court overruled his motion for 
leave to appeal on September 17, 1976, 11 two months after it 
construed § 2901.05(A) to place the burden of proving ab-
sence of self-defense on the prosecution. See State v. Robin-
son, supra. 
Responde t Isa c as tried in September 1975 for feloni-
ous assault. 12 T State showed that Isaac had severely 
beaten his former wife's boyfriend. Isaac claimed that the 
boyfriend punched him first and that he acted solely in self-
defense. Without objection from Isaac, the court instructed 
• Ohio defines murder as "purposely caus[ing] the death of another." 
. Ohio Rev . . Code .Ann~. § 2903 . .02(A).(1975).· · Bell received ·a sel\tence of 15 
y·ears to life imprisonment. · · .. · 
10 State v. Bell , No. 34727 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, April 8, 
1976). 
"State v. Bell, No. 76-573 (Ohio, Sept. 17, 1976). 
"See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.11 (1975): 
"(A) No person shall knowingly: 
"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another; 
"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a 
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the 
Revised Code. 
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault, a felony 
of the second degree." 
.. . · ·,;· .. ··· .. ·· 
... . -:· 
... 
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the jury that Isaac carried the burden of proving this defense 
by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury acquitted 
Isaac of felonious assault, but convicted him of the lesser in-
cluded offense of a gravated assault. 13 
en months fte Isaac's trial, the Ohio Supreme Court de-
cided State v. R.Q~, supra. In his appeal to the 
Plckaway County Court of Appeals, 14 Isaac relied upon Rob-
inson to challenge the burden of proof instructions given at 
his trial. The court rejected this challenge because Isaac { 
had failed to object to the jury instructions during trial, as 
required by Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30. 15 This default waived 
13 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.12 (1975) describes aggravated assault: 
"(A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress brought on by se-
rious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force 
shall knowingly: 
"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another; 
"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a 
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the 
Revised Code. 
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated assault, a fel-
ony of the fourth degree." 
The judge sentenced Isaac to a term of six months to five years imprison-
ment. According to the State's petition for certiorari, Isaac has been re-
leased from jail. This controversy is not moot, however. Seen. 7, supra. 
14 State v. Isaac, No. 346 (Ct. App. Pickaway County, Ohio, Feb. 11, 
1977). 
16At t~· time .. HughE,!S apd BelL were tried,· this rule stated in relevant 
part: 
"No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of 
the hearing of the jury." 
Shortly before Isaac's trial, Ohio amended the language of the rule in minor 
respects: 
"A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any 
instructions unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
I ,; : :·: ;· :: • • •• ~ ' -!-• • ,·'~: ,' • 
. ·.· ... 
. . 
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Isaac's claim. State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N. E. 
2d 379 (1960); State v. Slone, 45 Ohio App. 2d 24, 340 N. E. 
2d 413 (1975). 
The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Isaac's appeal for 
lack of a substantial constitutional question. 16 On the same 
day, that court decided State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 
95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977), and State v. Williams, 51 Ohio 
St. 2d 112, 364 N. E. 2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part andre-
manded, 438 U. S. 911 (1978). In Humphries the court 
ruled that every criminal trial held on or after January 1, 
1974, "is required to be conducted in accordance with the pro-
visions of [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2901.05]." !d., at 95, 364 
N. E. 2d, at 1355 (syllabus by the court). The court, how-
ever, refused to extend this ruling to a defendant who failed 
to comply with Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30. !d., at 102-103, 
364 N. E. 2d, at 1359. In Williams, the court declined to 
consider a constitutional challenge to Ohio's traditional self-
defense instruction, again because the defendant had not 
properly objected to the instruction at trial. 
AJ!_three re.sp.onden~ unsuccessfully sought writs of ha-
beas corpus from federal district courts. Hughes' petition 
alleged that the State had violated the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by failing to prove guilt "as to each and every 
essential element of the offense charged" and by failing to "so 
instruct" the jury. The District Judge rejected this claim, 
find4lg .. that Ohio law ·does not .cQnsider absence of self-de- ... 
fense an element of aggravated murder or voluntary man-
slaughter. Although the self-defense instructions at 
Hughes' trial might have violated § 2901.05(A), they did not 
violate the federal Constitution. Alternatively, the District 
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of 
the hearing of the jury." 
Both versions of the Ohio rule closely parallel Rule 30 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
•• State v. Isaac, No. 77-412 (Ohio, July 20, 1977). 
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Judge held that Hughes had waived his constitutional claim 
by failing to comply with Ohio's contemporaneous objection 
rule. Since Hughes offered no explanation for his failure to 
object, and showed no actual prejudice, Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), barred him from asserting the 
claim. Hughes v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C77-156A (N. D. 
Ohio, June 26, 1979). 
Bell's petition for habeas relief similarly alleged that the 
trial judge had violated due process by instructing "the jury 
that the accused must prove an affirmative defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence." The District Court acknowl-
edged that Bell had never raised this claim in the state 
courts. Observing, however, that the State addressed Bell's 
argument on the merits, the District Court ruled that Bell's 
default was not a "deliberate bypass." See Fay v. Noia, 372 
U. S. 391 (1963). Although the court cited our opinion in 
Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, it did not inquire whether Bell 
had shown cause for or prejudice from his procedural waiver. 
The court then ruled that Ohio could constitutionally burden 
Bell with proving self-defense since it had not defined ab-
sence of self-defense as an element of murder. Bell v. 
Perini, No. C 78-343 (N.D. Ohio, Dec. 26, 1978). 
Bell moved for reconsideration, urging that § 2901.05(A) 
had in fact defined absence of self-defense as an element of 
murder. The District Court rejected this argument and 
. .  . : ... ... then .. declared that the: '~r.eal.issue" was whether· Bell· was en~. 
. . titled. t~ retroa~tlve application of State v. Robi~son, suprd. 
Bell failed on this claim as well since Ohio's decision to limit 
retroactive application of Robinson "substantially further[ed] 
the State's legitimate interest in the finality of its decisions." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. A59. Indeed, the District Court 
noted that this Court had sanctioned just this sort of limit on 
retroactivity. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 
233, 244 n. 8 (1977). Bell v. Perini, No. C 78-343 (N.D. 
Ohio, Jan. 23, 1979). 
. . :: ~ :· ' ,• : ' . ~ ·. ~ . '~ .. : ... :··:· · 
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~aac's habeas petition was more complex than those sub-
mitted by Hughes and Bell. He urged that the Ohio Su-
preme Court had "failed to give relief [to him], despite its 
own pronouncement" that State v. Robinson would apply ret-
roactively. In addition, he declared broadly that the Ohio 
court's ruling was "contrary to the Supreme Court of the 
United States in regard to proving self-defense." The Dis-
trict Court determined that Isaac had waived any constitu-
tional claims by failing to present them to the Ohio trial 
court. Since he further failed to show either cause for or ac-
tual prejudice from the waiver, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 
supra, he could not present his claim in a federal habeas pro-
ceeding. Isaac v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C-2-7~278 (S.D. 
Ohio, June 26, 1978). 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed all C. /l-k 
three District Court orders. In Isaac v. Engle, 646 F. 2d 
1129 (CA6 1980), a majority of the en bane court ruled that 
Wainwright v. Sykes did not preclude consideration of Isaac's 
constitutional claims. At the time of Isaac's trial, the court 
noted, Ohio had consistently required defendants to prove af- · 
firmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
futility of objecting to this established practice supplied ade-
quate cause for Isaac's waiver. Prejudice, the second pre-
requisite for excusing a procedural default, was "clear" since 
the burden of proof is a critical element of factfinding, and 
;'· ·: · · ... . , . ·. · .:· .:··-·since· Isaac had ni.ade a substantial issue of self.:.defense. · !d.; · · : · .. ·· ... : ..... : ·. · 
at 1134. 
A majority of the court also believed that the instructions 
given at Isaac's trial violated due process. Four judges 
thought that § 2901.05(A) defined the absence of self-defense 
as an element of felonious and aggravated assault. While 
the State did not have to define its crimes in this manner, 
"due process require[d] it to meet the burden that it chose to 
assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135. A fifth judge believed that, 
even absent§ 2901.05(A), the Due Process Clause would com-
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pel the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense because 
that defense negates criminal intent, an essential element of 
aggravated and felonious assault. A sixth judge agreed that 
Ohio had violated Isaac's due process rights, but would have 
concentrated on the State's arbitrary refusal to extend the 
retroactive benefits of State v. Robinson, supra, to Isaac. 17 
Relying on the en bane decision in Isaac, two Sixth Circuit 
panels ordered the District Court to release Bell and Hughes 
unless the State chose to retry them within a reasonable 
time. Bell v. Perini, 635 F. 2d 575 (CA6 1980);18 Hughes v. 
Engle, judgment order reported at 642 F. 2d 451 (CA6 1980). 
We granted certiorari to review all three Sixth Circuit opin-
ions. 451 U. S. 906 (1981). 
II 
A state prisoner is entitled to relief under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2254 only if he is held "in custody in violation of the Con-
stitutiol1'or laws or treaties of the United States." Insofar 
• / 1 "' --as respondents s1m ly challenge the correctness of the self-
defense instructions un er io aw, they allege no depriva-
tion of federal rights and may not obtain habeas rehef. 'The 
lower courts,lloWever, read respondents' habeas petitions to 
state at least two constitutional claims. Respondents repeat 
both of those claims here . 
·· .. . ~ .. :". .: . . . ,A ·.· . . , .. . ·· ~~ . . : , . .... ·· 
First, respondents argue that § 2901.05, which governs the 
burden of proof in all criminal trials, implicitly designated ab-
sence of self-defense an element of the crimes charged 
17 The latter analysis paralleled the reasoning of the panel that originally 
decided the case. See Isaac v. Engle, 646 F. 2d 1122 (CA6 1980)'. 
Four members of the court dissented from the en bane opinion. Two 
judges would have found no constitutional violation and two would have 
barred consideration of Isaac's claims under Wainwright v. Sykes , supra. 
18 One judge dissented from this decision, indicating that Wainwright v. 
Sykes, supra, barred Bell's claims. 
. ~ : .. · . . :· . ~. ~ . ; . 
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against them. Since Ohio defined its cril_!les in this manner, 
respo.;ts cont~~~ our opinions inv:Tn re Winship, 397 
U. S. (1970); Kullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), 
andLPatterson v. Ne?fi York, 432 U. S. 197 \1977), ~eguire the 
prosecution to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reason-
able aoubt A plurality of the en bane Sfith Circuit seemed 
'-. 
to accept this argument in Isaac's appeal, finding that due 
process required the State "to meet the burden that it chose 
to assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135. 
w_e find t~is claim E.atently without merit. 19 Our opinions 
suggest 1Iiat the prosecution's constitutional duty to negate 
affirmative defenses may depend, at least in part, on the 
manner in which the State defines the charged crime. Com-
pare Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, with Patterson v. New 
York, supra. These decisions, however, do not suggest that 
whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particu-
lar circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably 
defined that circumstance as an element of the crime. A 
State may want to assume the burden of disproving an affir-
mative de ense WI ou a so es1 mg a sence o the de-
~ment of the crime. 20 ue Process Clause 
19 The State suggests that the ineffectiveness of this claim demonstrates 
that respondents suffered no actual prejudice from their procedural de-
fault. We agree that the claim is insufficient to support habeas relief, but 
,:·do not categotiz~ this· insufficiency as a lack of' prejudice. If a :state .. pris~. j·· · .. 
oner alleges no deprivation of a federal right, § 2254 is simply inapplicable. 
It is unnecessary in such a situation to inquire whether the prisoner pre-
served his claim before the state courts. 
w Definition of a crime's elements may have consequences under state 
law other than allocation of the burden of persuasion. For example, the 
Ohio Supreme Court interpreted § 2901.05(A) to require defendants to 
come forward with some evidence of affirmative defenses. State v. Robin-
son, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976). Defendants do not bear 
the same burden with respect to the elements of a crime; the State must 
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt even when the defendant 
introduces no evidence. See, e. g., State v. Isaac, 44 Ohio Misc. 87,337 N. 
E. 2d 818 (Munic. Ct. 1975). Moreover, while Ohio requires the trial court 
2 
·.:. · : ·. 
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does not mandate that when a State treats absence of an "af-
firmative defense" as an "element" of the crime for one pur- ~ 
pose, it must do so for all purposes. The structure of Ohio's 
Code suggests simply that the State decided to assist defen-
dants by requiring the prosecution to disprove certain affir-
mative defenses. Absent concrete evidence that the Ohio 
legislature or courts understood § 2901.05(A) to go further 
than this, we decline to accept respondents' construction of 
state law. While they attempt to cast their first claim in 
constitutional terms, we believe that this claim does no more 
than suggest that the instructions at respondents' trials may 
have violated state law. 21 
B 
Respondents also allege that, even without considering 
§ 29~e!...£.onstitutionally shift the bur_den of 
proving self-defense to them. All of the crimes charged 
agamsTtirem requfre a showing of purposeful or knowing be-
havior. These terms, according to respondents, imply a de-
gree of culpability that is absent when a person acts in self-
defense. See Committee Comment to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2901.21 (1975) ("generally, an offense is not committed un-
less a person . . . has a certain guilty state of mind at the 
time of his act or failure [to act]"); State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio 
· . . :- te ·Charge the jUry o~ alleleiDentS.of"a ·cnm.e, e: g·.; State·v:i3ridiJeman, 5i · 
Ohio App. 2d 105, 366 N. E. 2d 1378 (1977), vacated in part, 55 Ohio St. 2d 
261, 381 N. E. 2d 184 (1978), it does not require explicit instructions on the 
prosecution's duty to negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Abner, 55 Ohio St. 2d 251, 379 N. E. 2d 228 (1978). 
21 We have long recognized that a "mere error of state law" is not a de-
. nial of due process. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 731 (1948). If the 
contrary were true, then "every erroneous decision by a state court .on 
state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question." 
Ibid. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541 , 554-555 (1962); Bishop 
v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F. 2d 724, 726 (CA3 1980); United States ex rel . Bur-
nett v. Illinois, 619 F. 2d 668, 670-671 (CA7 1980). 
. . .·· ~ . ~ 
:::. · .. 
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App. 2d 284, 286--287, 290 N. E. 2d 921, 923 (1972) ("one who 
kills in self-defense does so without the mens rea that other-
wise would render him culpable of the homicide"). In addi-
tion, Ohio punishes only actions that are voluntary, Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.21(A)(1) (1975), and unlawful, State v. 
Simon, No. 6262, p. 13 (Ct. App. Montgomery County, Ohio, 
Jan. 16, 1980), modified on reconsideration (Jan. 22, 1980). 
Self-defense, respondents urge, negates these elements of 
criminal behavior. Therefore, once the defendant raises the 
possibility of self-defense, respondents contend that the 
State must disprove that defense as part of its task of estab-
lishing guilty mens rea, voluntariness, and unlawfulness. 
The Due Process Clause, according to respondents' interpre-
tation of Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson, forbids the 
States from disavowing any portion of this burden. 22 
This argument states a colorable constitutional claim. 
l
Several courts have applied our Mullaney and Patterson 
opinions to charge the prosecution with the constitutional 
duty of proving absence of self-deFense. 23 Most OfEheseaeci-
-----------------------
22 In further support of the claim that, § 2901.05 aside, due process re-
quires the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense, respondent Bell 
maintains that the States may not constitutionally punish actions taken in 
self-defense. If fundamental notions of due process prohibit 
criminalization of actions taken in self-defense, Bell suggests, then absence 
of self-defense is a vital element of every crime. See Jeffries & Stephan, 
Defenses, Presumptiorrs, and Bur.den of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88· Yale . . 
L. J . 1325, 1366--1379 (1979); Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proving 
Self-Defense-With Analysis of Related Ohio Law, 11 Akron L. Rev. 717, 
758-759 (1978); Note , The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses After 
Patterson v. New York , 78 Colum. L. Rev. 655, 672-673 (1978); Note , Bur-
dens of Persuasion in Criminal Proceedings: The Reasonable Doubt Stan-
dard After Patterson v. N ew York , 31 U. Fla. L.~385, 415-416 (1979). 
23 E . g., Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F. 2d 161 CA5 1981); Holloway v. 
McEl1·oy, 632 F. 2d 605 (CA5 19~· rt. deni:e , 451 U. S. 1028 (1981); 
Wynn v. Mahoney , 600 F . 2d 448 CA4) ert. denied , 444 U. S. 950 (1979); 
Commonwealth v. Hilbert , 476 Pa. 88, 382 A. 2d 724 (1978). See also 
Comment, 11 Akron L. Rev. , supra n. 22; Note, 78 Colum. L. Rev., supra 
n. 22. 
'. :~· : .. . ..... ' .. 
. .. . . ~ ':: . . . . . · .. 
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sions adopt respondents' reasoning that due process com-
mands the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense if that 
defense negates an element, such as purposeful conduct, of 
the charged crime. While other courts have rejected this 
type of claim, 24 the controversy suggests that respondents' 
second argument states at least a plausible constitutional 
claim. We proceed, therefore, to determine whether re-
·spondents preserved this claim befo~ate court d, if 
not, o mqmre w et er the principles articulated i Wain-
umght v. Sy es, supra, ar cons1 eration of the claim in a 
federal habeas proceeding. 25 ---- ----
~
24 E. g., Carter v. Jago, 637 F. 2d 449 (CA6 1980); Baker v. Muncy, 619 
F. 2d 327 (CA4 1980). 
25 As we recognized in Sykes, 433 U. S., at 78-79, the problem of waiver 
is separate from the question whether a state prisoner has exhausted state 
remedies. Section 2254(b) requires habeas applicants to exhaust those 
remedies "available in the courts of the State." This requirement, how-
ever, refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal peti-
tion. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 516 (1972); Fay v. Noia, 372 
U. S. 391, 435 (1963). Respondents, of course, long ago completed their 
direct appeals. Ohio, moreover, provides only limited collateral review of 
convictions; prisoners may not raise claims that could have been litigated 
before judgment or on direct appeal. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2953.21(A) (1975); Collins v. Perini, 594 F. 2d 592 (CA6 1979); Keener v. 
Ridenour, 594 F. 2d 581 (CA6 1979). Since respondents could have chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Ohio's traditional self-defense instruction at 
... ... tljal or on direct appeal, we agree with the lo~~r courts that ~.tate collat-
. . . . ei'afreiiE~f is unavailabl~ to ~espondents and, therefore/ that they' have ex- . 
hausted their state remedies with respect to this claim. 
In addition to the claims discussed in text, respondents contend that 
Ohio's failure to apply State v. Robinson retroactively to them violates the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Respondents' due process 
claim asserts that Ohio has no rational reason for refusing to apply Robin-
son to all defendants tried after the effective date of§ 2901.05(A). Their 
equal protection claim rests on the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court has 
applied Robinson retroactively to defendants convicted in nonjury trials, 
even when those defendants raised no burden-of-proof objection at trial. 
See State v. Humphries , 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977). 
We do not believe respondents' habeas petitions fairly raise either of 
.· ... . J.·: .. :, 
·. · 
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III 
None of the respondents challenged the constitutionality of 
the self-defense instruction at trial. 26 They thus violated 
Ohio Rule Grim. Proc. 30, which requires contemporaneous 
objections to jury instructions. Failure to comply with Rule 
30 is adequate, under Ohio law, to bar appellate consideration 
of an objection. See, e. g., State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 
2d 95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977); State v. Gordon, 28 Ohio St. 
2d 45, 276 N. E. 2d 243 (1971). The Ohio Supreme Court has 
enforced this bar against the very due process argument 
raised here. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St. 2d 112, 364 N. 
E. 2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part and remanded, 438 U. S. 
911 (1978). 27 We must determine, therefore, whether re-
these claims. In particular, we find no trace of the equal protection argu-
ment in any of the proceedings below. We doubt, moreover, that respon-
dents have properly exhausted available state remedies for these claims. 
Respondents could not have known the type of retroactivity Ohio would 
accord State v. Robinson until the Ohio Supreme Court decided 
Humphries, supra. The latter decision was rendered on the same day 
that the court refused to review Isaac's direct appeal and long after the 
convictions of Bell and Hughes became final. Accordingly, respondents 
did not have the opportunity on direct appeal to confront the Ohio courts 
with the equal protection and due process problems Humphries allegedly 
creates. Nor did the Ohio Supreme Court consider those problems in 
Humphries. Under these circumstances, Ohio might allow respondents to 
raise t~eir equal prote~tion and. due proce~& claims in a collateral proceeq- . 
·· ing. ·we decline·, therefore, to address those ciaims at this time. See.Pi- · 
card v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971). 
26 While respondent Bell does not deny his procedural default, he argues 
that we should overlook it because the State did not raise the issue in its 
initial filings with the District Court. In some cases a State's plea of default 
may come too late to bar consideration of the prisoner's constitutional 
claim. E. g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 n. 12 (1981); Jenkins v. 
Anderson, 447 U. S. 231, 234 n. 1 (1980). In this case, however, both the 
District Court and Court of Appeals evaluated Bell's default. Prudential 
considerations, therefore, do not deter us from also reaching the issue. 
See Jenkins, supra, at 234 n. 1. 
27 In Isaac's own case, the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to entertain his 
·~ .. · · .. ..· .··. 
. . ~. : ... . ·. 
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spondents may litigate, in a federal habeas proceeding, a con-
stitutional claim that they forfeited before the state courts. 
A 
The writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored 
position in our jurisprudence. Tracing its roots deep into 
English common law, 28 it claims a place in Article I of our 
Constitution. 29 Today, as in prior centuries, the writ is a 
bulwark against convictions that violate "fundamental fair-
ness." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 97 (STEVENS, J., 
concurring). 
We have always recognized, however, that the Great Writ 
entails significant costs. 3° Collateral review of a conviction 
challenge to the self-defense instruction because of his failure to comply 
with Rule 30. The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Isaac's 
appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question. It is unclear 
whether these appeals raised a constitutional, or merely statutory, attack 
on the self-defense instruction used at Isaac's trial. If Isaac presented his 
constitutional argument to the state courts, then they determined, on the 
very facts before us, that the claim was waived. 
Relying upon State v. Long, 53 Ohio St. 2d 91, 372 N. E. 2d 804 (1978), 
respondents argue that the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized its power, 
under Ohio's plain-error rule, to excuse Rule 30 defaults. Long, however, 
does not persuade us that the Ohio courts would have excused respondents' 
defaults. First, the Long court stressed that the plain-error rule applies 
only i1;1 "exceptional circumstances," SU\!h as where, "but for the error, the 
. ' . ;· . . .. ' outcotn~ or the trhi.l· dearly' would have' been otherwise:" jd:·, at' 96, 97, 
372 N. E. 2d, at 807, 808. Second, the Long decision itself refused to in-
voke the plain-error rule for a defendant who presented a constitutional 
claim identical to the one pressed by respondents. 
"'See 3 W. Blackst Commentaries *129-*138; Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs v Brien,1 3] A. C. 603 (H. L.). 
29 Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
30 J udge~nry J . Friendly: put the matter well when he wrote that 
"[t]he pro erbial man from ars would surely think we must consider our 
system of c · ina! justice rribly bad if we are willing to tolerate such ef-
forts at undoingfua ents of conviction." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 
. ·~ · .... . . ..... . ~ ... 
· .. .. • • l . ~. . . . . .. 
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extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused. 
As Justice Harlan once observed, "[b]oth the individual crim----inal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that 
there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an 
end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused 
not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on 
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the 
community." Sanders v. United es, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See so Hank n v. North Caro-
lina, 432 U. S. 233, 247 (19 ) (POWELL, J. concurring in the 
judgment). By frustratin these inte ts, the writ under-
mines the usual principles of · of litigation. 31 
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the 
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates 
society's resources at one "time and place in order to decide, 
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or 
innocence." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 90. Our Con-
stitution and laws surround the trial with a multitude of pro-
tections for the accused. Rather than enhancing these safe-
guards, ready availability of habeas corpus may diminish 
their sanctity by suggesting to the trial participants that 
there may be no need to adhere to those safeguards during 
the trial itself. 
We must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus fre-
quently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders . 
. ,.- ·· .. . ,· J:>.a~sage of time, ,.erosipn of memory, and dispersion .. of .w.it., 
. . nesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible. While a . 
145 (1970). 
3'Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this absence of final-
ity also frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation. Deterrence depends 
upon the expectation that "one violating the law will swiftly and certainly 
become subject to punishment, just punishment." Rehabilitation de-
mands that the convicted defendant realize "that he is justly subject to 
sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation." Bator, Finality in 
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. 
Rev. 441, 452 (1963); Friendly, supra n. 30, at 146. 
I ~ 
. .·. ,• .. . . ·.: .. . 
't, · . ~ :. 4' :·. . . i ·:. ; ...... 
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habeas writ may, in theory, entitle the defendant only tore-
trial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete 
freedom from prosecution. 
Finally, the Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal 
system. The States possess primary authority for defining 
and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also 
hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional 
rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate 
both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and 
their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. 32 
In Wainwright v. Sykes, we recognized that these costs 
are particularly high when a trial default has barred a pris-
oner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in 
the state courts. In that situation, the trial court has had no 
opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retri-
als. The defendant's counsel, for whatever reasons, has de-
tracted from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a 
claim in that forum. 33 The state appellate courts have not 
had a chance to mend their own fences and avoid federal in-
trusion. Issuance of a habeas writ, finally, exacts an extra 
charge by undercutting the State's ability to enforce its pro-
cedural rules. These considerations supported our Sykes 
ruling that, when a procedural default bars state litigation of 
a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal 
habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. 
,".· 
. . . . ~ .... :·:·. : ': ·.. . .~: : .: .. 
32 During the last two decades, our constitutional jurisprudence has rec-
ognized numerous new rights for criminal defendants. Although some ha-
beas writs correct violations of long-established constitutional rights, oth-
ers vindicate more novel claims. State courts are understandably 
frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to 
have a federal court discover, during a § 2254 proceeding, new constitu-
tional commands. 
33 Counsel's default may stem from simple ignorance or the pressures of 
trial. We noted in Sykes, however, that a defendant's counsel may delib-
erately choose to withhold a claim in order to "sandbag''-to gamble on ac-
quittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay off. 
See 433 U. S., at 89--90. 
':,,t , ';I 
' ~ ·. . .. ~ ·. ... · .... 
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Respondents urge that we should limit Sykes to cases in 
which the constitutional error did not affect the truthfinding 
function of the trial. In Sykes itself, for example, the pris-
oner alleged that the State had violated the rights guaran-
teed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). While 
this defect was serious, it did not affect the determination of 
guilt at trial. 
We do not believe, however, that the principles of Sykes j 
lend themselves to this limitation. The costs outlined above 
do not depend upon the type of claim raised by the prisoner. 
While the nature of a constitutional claim may affect the cal-
culation of cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the 
need to make that threshold showing. We reaffirm, there-l y 
fore, that any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the 
federal courthouse after a state procedural default must dem-
onstrate cause and actual prejudice before obtaining relief. 
B 
Respondents seek cause for their defaults in two circum-
stances. First, they urge that they could not have known at 
the time of their trials that the Due Process Clause addresses 
the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Second, they 
contend that any objection to Ohio's self-defense instruction 
would have been futile since Ohio had long required criminal 
defendants to bear the burden of proving this affirmative 
····:····.c:: deferise·. · ·.:.- ·. · ........ ··: · ··· .. ·. <· .. '>·· ··:.··· ,·~ ~ •.. ,:, ..... ; .•. 
We note at the outset that the futility of presenting an 
objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for 
a failure to object at trial. If a defendant perceives a viable 
constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the fed-
eral courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply be-
cause he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim. ;j.j 
/ 
34 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 515 (1976) (POWELL, J. , con-
curring) (the policy disfavoring inferred waivers of constitutional rights 
"need not be carried to the length of allowing counsel for a defendant delib-
erately to forgo objection to a curable trial defect, even though he is aware 
.;··. 
. ... : •' : · •' 
. . •: ·· . ··· · .. : . . : . 
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Even a state court that has previously rejected a constitu-
tional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the conten-
tion is valid. . Allowing criminal defendants to deprive the 
state courts of this opportunity would contradict the princi-
ples supporting Sykes. 35 
Respondents' claim, however, is not simply one of futility. 
They further allege that, at the time they were tried, they 
could not know that Ohio's self-defense instructions raised 
constitutional questions. A criminal defendant, they urge, 
may not waive constitutional objections unknown at the time 
of trial. 
We need not decide whether the novelty of a constitutional 
claim ever establishes cause for a failure to object. 36 We 
might hesitate to adopt a rule that would require trial counsel 
either to exercise extraordinary vision or to object to every 
aspect of the proceedings in the hope that some aspect mign 
mask a latent constitutional claim. On the other hand, later 
discovery of a constitutional defect unknown at the time of 
trial does not invariably render the original trial funda-
mentally unfair. 37 These concerns, ·however, need 'not detain 
of the factual and legal basis for an objection, simply because he thought 
objection would be futile"); Myers v. Washington, 646 F. 2d 355, 364 (CA9 
1981) (Poole, J., dissenting) (futility cannot constitute cause if it means 
simply that a claim was "unacceptable to that particular court at that par-
·.'.· . . .. · ... ticula:r time''), :cert-:: pen~ing, .. N9·: 81-1.056. · : :·: ; ·.- :: . · ···: ...... · ... · .;.. , 
: . 35 In fact, the decision to withhold ·a known constitutional claim resem-
bles the type of deliberate bypass condemned in Fay v. Noia , 372 U. S. 391 
(1963). Since the cause and prejudice standard is more demanding than 
Fay's deliberate bypass requirement, see Sykes, supra, at 87, we are confi-
dent that perceived futility alone cannot constitute cause. 
36 The State stressed at oral argument before this Court that it does not 
seek such a ruling. Instead, Ohio urges merely that "when the tools are 
available to construct the argument, ... you can charge counsel with the 
obligation of raising that argument." Transcript at 8-9. 
37 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (separate 
opinion of Harlan, J.); Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 665-666 
(1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
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us here since respondents' claims were far from unknown at 
the time of their trials. 
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), decided four-and-one-
half years before the first of respondents' trials, laid the basis 
for their constitutional claim. In Winship we held that "the 
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 
I d., at 364. During the five years following this decision, 38 
dozens of defendants relied upon this language to challenge 
the constitutionality of rules requiring them to bear a burden 
of proof. 39 In most of these cases, the defendants' claims 
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 246-248 (1977) (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
38 Even before Winship, criminal defendants and courts perceived that 
placing a burden of proof on the defendant may violate due process. For 
example, in Stump v. Bennett, 398 F. 2d 111 (CA8 1968), cert. denied, 393 
U. S. 1001 (1968), the Eighth Circuit ruled en bane that an Iowa rule re-
quiring defendants to prove alibis by a preponderance of the evidence vio-
lated du~ process. The court, moreover, observed: "That an oppressive 
shifting of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant violates due process 
is not a new doctrine within constitutional law." !d., at 122. See also 
Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U. S. 253 (1968) (vacating and remanding lower 
court decision for reconsideration in light of Stump); State v. Nales , 28 
Conn. Supp. 28, 248 A. 2d 242 (1968) (holding that due process forbids re-
. quiring defendant to prove "lawful excuse" for possession of housebreaking 
.. : · .... . i ·, ·. -:· =:,.,,:tools). · ·. : · .· . .- ·:· ··_·; ·_ .. ·.:. ·' ' : ··. · . · ·.-, ···.-.. . .. .-,. .. . ··:_..-_. · ·/ .. · .... ·o.· ·, · .. .-·: . ... 
39 See, e. g., State v. Commenos, 461 S. W. 2d 9 (Mo. 1970) (en bane) 
(intent to return allegedly stolen item); Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 475 
P. 2d 671 (1970) (insanity), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 940 (1971); Common-
wealth v. O'Neal, 441 Pa. 17, 271 A. 2d 497 (1970) (absence of malice); 
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A. 2d 89 (1970) (insanity), over-
ruled, Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A. 2d 880 (1974); Smith v. 
Smith, 454 F . 2d 572 (CA5 1971) Utlibi), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 885 (1972); 
United States v. Braver, 450 F. 2d 799 (CA2 1971) (inducement), cert. de-
nied, 405 U. S. 1064 (1972); Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (Me. 
1972) (heat of passion), aff'd sub nom. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F. 2d 943 
(CAl 1973), vacated, 414 U. S. 1139 (1974), on remand, 496 F. 2d 1303 
(CA11974), aff'd, 421 U. S. 684 (1975); State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 
. ·. . 
. '· .. ' ~ ,:' . , ... ·: .. : .. 
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countered well-established principles of law. Nevertheless, 
numerous courts agreed that the Due Process Clause re-
quires the prosecution to bear the burden of disproving cer-
tain affirmative defenses. 40 In light of this activity, we can-
not say that respondents lacked the tools to construct their 
constitutional claim. 41 
P. 2d 322 (1971) (lack of malice aforethought or presence of legal justifica-
tion); State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 301 A. 2d 547 (1972) (possession of li-
cense to deal in drugs), overruled on other grounds, State v. Whistnant, 
179 Conn. 576, 427 A. 2d 414 (1980); In re Foss , 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P. 2d 
1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (en bane) (entrapment); Woods v. State, 233 
Ga. 347, 211 S. E. 2d 300 (1974) (authority to sell narcotic drugs), appeal 
dismissed, 422 U. S. 1002 (1975); State v. Buzynski, 330 A. 2d 422 (Me. 
1974) (mental disease); People v. Jordan, 51 Mich. App. 710, 216 N. W. 2d 
71 (1974) (absence of intent), disapproved on other grounds, People v. 
Johnson, 407 Mich. 196, 284 N. W. 2d 718 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rose, 
457 Pa. 380, 321 A. 2d 880 (1974) (intoxication); Retail Credit Co. v. Dade 
County, 393 F. Supp. 577 (SD Fla. 1975) (maintenance of reasonable proce-
dures); Fuentes v. State, 349 A. 2d 1 (Del. 1975) (extreme emotional dis-
tress), overruled, State v. Moyer, 387 A. 2d 194 (Del. 1978); Henderson v. 
State , 234 Ga. 827, 218 S. E. 2d 612 (1975) (self-defense); State v. Grady, 
276 Md. 178, 345 A. 2d 436 (1975) (alibi); Evans v. State , 28 Md. App. 640, 
349 A. 2d 300 (1975) (absence of malice; further describing in detail that 
due process requires prosecution to negate most affirmative defenses, in-
cluding self-defense), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A. 2d 629 (1976); State v. Rob-
inson, 48 Ohio App. 2d 197, 356 N. E. 2d 725 (1975) (self-defense), aff'd, 47 
Ohio St. 2d 103,351 N. ·E. 2d 88 (1976). See also Trimble v. State, 229 Ga. 
· · · . · •··· .. · ,·. 399'; 191 S. K 2d 857 (1972) ·(alibi),· overruled, Patterson v:: State; 233 Ga:.".. . ... 
· 724, 213 S. E. 2d 612 (1975); Grace v. State, 231 Ga. 113, 118, 125-128, 200 
S. E. 2d 248, 252, 256-258 (1973) (dissenting opinions) (insanity). 
Several commentators also perceived that Winship might alter tradi-
tional burdens of proof for affirmative defenses . E . g., W. LaFave & A. 
Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 8, pp. 46-51 (1972); The Supreme 
Court 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 159 (1970); Student Symposium, 33 
Ohio St. L. J., supra n. 2, at 421; Comment, Due Process and Supremacy 
as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism After 
Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 U. Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974). 
'" Even those decisions rejecting the defendant's claim, of course, show 
that the issue had been perceived by other defendants and that it was a live 
one in the courts at the time. 
"Respondent Isaac even had the benefit of our opinion in Mullaney v. 
... ·.·.··.; .... . . : ": . : . ·-: 
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We do not suggest that every competent counsel would 
have relied upon Winship to assert the unconstitutionality of 
a rule saddling criminal defendants with the burden of prov-
ing an affirmative defense. Every trial presents a myriad of 
possible claims. A competent counsel might have over-
looked respondents' due process argument while pursuing 
other avenues of defense. We have long recognized, how-
ever, that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 
only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure 
that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceiv-
able constitutional claim. Where the basis of a constitutional 
claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived 
and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality 
counsel against labelling alleged unawareness of the objection 
as cause for a procedural default. 42 
Wilbur, supra, decided three months before his trial. In Mullaney we in-
validated a Maine practice requiring criminal defendants to negate malice 
by proving that they acted in the heat of passion. We thus explicitly ac-
knowledged the link between Winship and constitutional limits on assign-
ment of the burden of proof. Cf. Lee v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 461, 462 
(1979) (per curiam) (suggesting that defendants who failed, after Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), to object to the exclusion of women from 
juries must show cause for the failure). 
Respondents argue at length that, before the Ohio Supreme Court's de-
cision in State v. Robinson, supra, they did not know that Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2901.05(A) c~anged the traditional burden of proof. Ohio's inter-
. . · pretation: of§ 29ot:05(A), however, :is relevant only to claims that we 'reject 
independently of respondents' procedural default. See supra, at 10-12; 
n. 25, supra. 
'
2 Respondents resist this conclusion by noting that Hankerson v. North 
Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 243 (1977), gave Mullaney v. Wilbur, the opinion 
explicitly recognizing Winship's effect on affirmative defenses , "complete 
retroactive effect." Hankerson itself, however, acknowledged the distinc-
tion between the retroactive availability. of a constitutional decision and the 
right to claim that availability after a procedural default. JUSTICE WHITE's 
majority opinion forthrightly suggested that the States "may be able to in-
sulate past convictions [from the effect of Mullaney] by enforcing the nor-
mal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of 
any claim of error." 432 U. S., at 244 n. 8. In this case we accept the 
·.:.: .· .··.·· 
··.· .. .. ...... 
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c 
Respondents, finally, urge that we should replace or sup-
plement the cause-and-prejudice standard with a plain-error 
inquiry. We rejected this argument when pressed by a fed-
eral prisoner, see United States v. Frady, No. 80--1595, and 
find it no more compelling here. The federal courts apply a 
plain-error rule for direct review of federal convictions. 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). Federal habeas challenges to 
state convictions, however, entail greater finality problems 
and special comity concerns. We remain convinced that the 
burden of justifying federal habeas relief for state prisoners 
is "greater than the showing required to establish plain error 
on direct appeal." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. 8. 145, 154 
(1977); United States v. Frady, supra, at --. 43 
Contrary to respondents' assertion, moreover, a plain-er-
ror standard is unnecessary to correct miscarriages of jus-
tice. The terms "cause" and "actual prejudice" are not rigid 
concepts; they take their meaning from the principles of com-
ity and finality discussed above. In appropriate cases those 
force of that language as applied to defendants tried after Winship. 
Since we conclude that these respondents lacked cause for their default, 
we do not consider whether they also suffered actual prejudice. Respon-
dents urge that their prejudice was so great that it should permit relief 
even in the absence of cause. Sykes, however, stated these criteria in the 
· !:Qnju~ctiv.e al}~ .. ~he.: facts o.f tl)is . ca~e . .dq . not p~~uade us to depart from 
that approach:· · · · · · · · · · · '.. : · 
..a Respondents bolster their plain-error contention by observing that 
Ohio will overlook a procedural default if the trial defect constituted plain 
error. Ohio, however, has declined to exercise this discretion to review 
the type of claim pressed here. Seen. 27, supra. If Ohio had exercised 
its discretion to consider respondents' claim, then their initial default 
would no longer block federal review. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, at 
688 n: 7; County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 147-154 
(1979). Our opinions, however, make clear that the States have the pri-
mary responsibility to interpret and apply their plain error-rules. Cer-
tainly we should not rely upon a state plain-error rule when the State has 
refused to apply that rule to the very sort of claim at issue. 
'.; : ', :. . .. . .. ·: ~ ·. · ...... ·.:· ..  : >· 
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principles must yield to the imperative of a fundamentally un-
just incarceration. Since we are confident that victims of a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-
. prejudice standard, see Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 91; 
id., at 94-97 (STEVENS, J., concurring), we decline to adopt 
the more vague inquiry suggested by the words "plain 
error." 
IV 
Close analysis of respondents' habeas petitions reveals only 
one colorable constitutional claim. Because respondents 
failed to comply with Ohio's procedures for raising that con-
tention, and because they have not demonstrated cause for 
the default, they are barred from asserting that claim under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The judgments of the Court of Appeals 
are reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
So ordered. 
··: .. :.:· .. · ··: ·.· . ..... .. . ~ ' . . ~ ... "!• ' :. \ • . ' ••• : ~: .' .. • • :: : ,: ' : . ',. • ,: ··· .: ... .:.· 
dfl 02/10/82 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Engle v. Isaac---No. 80-1430 
I recommend you join Jusitce O'Connor's opinion. 
This is really a masterful and canny opinion. { J ·~) 
The key to the opinion is in Part IIA. I was a 
bit troubled by this section on first reading. In that Part, 
Justice O'Connor finds the reasoning of the CA6 to be "patently 
without merit." The CA had found on an analogy to Mullaney, that 
once the state had assigned itself the burden of proving absence of 
self-defense, due process required that it in fact bear that burden. 
Just as the Court in Mullaney required the state to bear the burden 
of proving the elements of the crime the state defined, so, too, due 
process requires the state to bear the burden if it chooses to 
assign that burden to itself: "From the point of view of fairness 
and due process, there is no practical difference between requiring 
a state to prove the elements of crimes beyond a reasonable doubt 
and requiring it to meet its assumed burden of proving absence of 
affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt" 
"' 
2. 
I do not think I would have characterized the 
CA6's position as patently wrong. I think that the claim was 
colorable, and that Justice 0' Connor could either have gone on to 
reach the merits of the claim--as in effect she does--or could have 
reached the cause and prejudice question as to this claim as well. 
Of course I can well understand why Justice O'Connor wished to get 
rid of the claim without reaching cause and prejudice--this was the 
one claim as to which Isaac might have had "cause." Still I am 
puzzled why she felt to treat the claim quite so lightly. Perhaps 
she thought it would make the succeeding section look somewhat 
inconsistent if she treated this first claim as colorable but went 
on to decide its ultimate merits rather than deciding the cause and 
prejudice question. That is, in the succeeding section she might 
also have undertaken to decide the constitutional claim without 
reaching the "cause and prejudice" formulation. I do not think that 
this inconsistency would have been genuine; I think that the Court 
is free to kick these claims out either on cause and prejudice or 
for failure to raise a winning constitutional claim. But I do not 
think any of this matters enough to hold off joining--unless you 
feel some urge to protect your position in Mullaney (although the CA 
was really extending Mullaney). You might suggest that it is a bit 
harsh to characterize the claim as colorless or patently wrong. 
' .. 
February 10, 1982 
80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac, et al 
Dear Sandra: 
This is a personal supplement to my formal join note. 
I like very much your opinions in both this case and Frady. 
Engle is a difficult case in view of the peculiar Ohio 
situation. I think you wrote a deft and masterful opinion. 
I make two comments, one simply as a matter of 
information and the other a suggestion for your 
consideration. 
As the author of Mullaney, I was particularly 
interested in the way you dealt with it. Although I would 
not have said - perhaps understandably - that the Mullaney 
claim in Isaac was "patently without merit", I do agree that 
there may be a difference - as you suggest - between an 
"element of a crime" and "an affirmative defense", even 
though the state has chosen to assume the burden of 
disproving the latter. I may write briefly in concurrence 
if other Justices in dissent challenge your position on 
Mullaney. 
~ 
I particularly liked Part ~A in which you discussed 
1\ 
habeas corpus. Its abuse has been a subject of special 
interest to me. Our views are entirely congruent. If you 
have not done so, you might take a look at my concurring 
412 u.s. 218 250, and 
your 
ustice Paul Reardon. 
'/tcr <J1' -7 What I wrote in Bustamonte became the "law of the land" 
11 
in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 




~ He..r a •''-
~o-ease~w~roprt~te ~~- strongly supportive 
"" 
of your views. 
~ 
With or without ~addition, your opinions i i isaac 
and Frady will add a significant measure of needed 
~4...-<'# ~ 
rationality to~our criminal justice system. 
Sincerely, 
February 10, 1982 
80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac, et al 
Dear Sandra: 
This is a personal supplement to my formal join note. 
I like very much your opinions in both thi.s case and Frady. 
Engle is a di ff icul t case i. n vlew of the peculiar Ohio 
situation. I think you wrote a deft and masterful opinion. 
I make two comments, one si.mply as a matter of information 
and the other a suggestion for your consideration. 
As the author of Mullaney, I was particularly 
interested in the way you dealt with it. Although I would 
not have said - perhaps understandably - that the ~4ullane* 
claim in Isaac was "patently without merit", I do agree tat 
there may be a difference - as you suggest - between an 
"element of a crime" and "an affirmative defense", even 
though the state has chosen to assume the burden of 
disproving the latter. I may write briefly in concurrence 
i.f other Justices in dissent challenge your position on 
f'.1ullaney. 
I particularly liked Part III A in which you discussed 
habeas corpus. Its abuse has been a subject of special 
interest to me. Our views are entirely congruent. If you 
have not done so, you might take a look at my concurring 
opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 u.s. 218 250, and 
particularly pp. 262, 264. What I wrote in Bustamante 
became the "law of the land" in Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 
465 {1976). You may wish to cite these cases as they are 
strongly supportive of your views. 
With or without these additions, your opinions in Isaac 
and Frad¥ ~~ill add a significant measure of needed 






February 10, 1902 
80-1430 Enqle v. Isaac, et al 
Dear Sandra: 
Please joi.n me. 
Sincerely, 
Justi.ce O'Connor 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. February 10, 1972 
/ 
Re: Engle v. Isaac (No. 80-1430) 
Dear Sandra: 
I will circulate a dissent in due course. 
Sincerely, 
Justice o•connor 














JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.§ttpttlltt <!j'01trl qf tlft ~t~ .§taftg 
Jilas!rittgtcn. ~. <!j'. 211.?~~ 
February 10, 1982 
Re: No. 80-l430 Engle v. Isaac 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Sincerel~~ 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
;§u.pumr <q:cu.rt cf tqr ~ttitrb .:§brltG 
1UaGfringtcn, 1£l. <q:. 2ll,?Jt~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL February 10, 1982 
i/ 
Re: No. 80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac 
Dear Sandra: 









JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.in.vrtmt <!}cttd d tqt 'Juittb .ibdt.&' 
'~lht,gftiugtou. ~. <!} . 2ll bi~ ~ 
February 11, 1982 
No. 80-1430 Engle v. Isaac 
Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for your letter concerning the 
referenced case. I am delighted you have seen fit 
to join the opinion. 
Your suggestions are excellent. When I 
circulate the next printed draft, I will add the 






ENGLE v. ISAAC 11 
against them. Since Ohio defined its crimes in this manner, 
respondents contend, our opinions in In re Winship, 397 
U. S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), 
and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977), require the 
prosecution to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reason-
able doubt. A plurality of the en bane Sixth Circuit seemed 
to accept this argument in Isaac's appeal, finding that due 
process required the State "to meet the burden that it chose 
to assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135. 
~--"""V~I.e-~a-t,fH£. re-Jfftii. 'fH~:enttv without merit. 19 Our opinions 
suggest that the prosecution's constitutional duty to negate 
affirmative defenses may depend, at least in part, on the 
manner in which the State defines the charged crime. Com-
pare Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, with Patterson v. New 
York, supra. These decisions, however, do not suggest that 
whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particu-
lar circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably 
defined that circumstance as an element of the crime. A 
State may want to assume the burden of disproving an affir-
mative defense without also designating absence of the de-
fense an element of the crime. 20 The Due Process Clause 
19 The State suggests that the ineffectiveness of this claim demonstrates 
that respondents suffered no actual prejudice from their procedural de-
fault. We agree that the claim is insufficient to support habeas relief, but 
. : "i: .. . , · , .-do not. categorize this.:h•sufficienc.y as a lack .of preju.dice. .If .a. state pris-
oner 'alleges no depri~ation of a federal right, § 2254 is simply inapplicable. 
It is unnecessary in such a situation to inquire whether the prisoner pre-
served his claim before the state courts. 
20 Definition of a crime's elements may have consequences under state 
Jaw other than allocation of the burden of persuasion. For example, the 
Ohio Supreme Court interpreted § 2901.05(A) to require defendants to 
come forward with some evidence of affirmative defenses. State v. Robin· 
son, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E . 2d 88 (1976). Defendants do not bear 
the same burden with respect to the elements of a crime; the State must 
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt even when the defendant 
introduces no evidence. See, e. g., State v. Isaac, 44 Ohio Misc. 87, 337 N. 
E. 2d 818 (Munic. Ct. 1975). Moreover, while Ohio requires the trial court 
. ~ .. 
• • ''l , ., :· •. 
crtiZel) . . , ':Jc.n~eC~IO'r'" v . V"''J[O.Y''V' ' ''"") ] 117\ v ·· ._, , 
aJtJl ~{,~ (1'173) ( POWELL.., ::r.., CoVlCU.t'"'r iV\4) . m See 
a.14flo S+otle v . '"'Poa..ue,l\, 402~ IJ.S. 1../1.5" '(JCf7t..) . 
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extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused. 
As Justice Harlan once observed, "[b]oth the individual crim-
inal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that 
there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an 
end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused 
not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on 
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the 
community." Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Hankerson v. North Caro-
lina, 432 U. S. 233, 247 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment). By frustrating these interests, the writ under-
mines the usual principles of finality of litigation. 31 
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the 
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates 
society's resources at one "time and place in order to decide, 
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or 
innocence." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 90. Our Con-
stitution and laws surround the trial with a multitude of pro-
tections for the accused. Rather than enhancing these safe-
guards, ready availability of habeas corpus may diminish 
their sanctity by suggesting to the trial participants that 
there may be no need to adhere to those safeguards during 
the trial itself. 
We must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus fre-
quently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders. 
, :'·.-... Paf!s~ge of time, .erosion o.f ~emory, and dispersion of .wit- :; 
. . nesses may render retria( difficult, everi impossible. While a 
[adc\i~cM ~ L'l· 3D . Stto.ri 
o Y\. V\ ec.o I i v"t. > '1\0 145 (1970). 
31 Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this absence of final-
ity also frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation. Deterrence depends 
upon the expectation that "one violating the law will swiftly and certainly 
become subject to punishment, just punishment." Rehabilitation de-
mands that the convicted defendant realize "that he is justly subject to 
sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation. " Bator, Finality in 
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. 
Rev. 441 , 452 (1963); Friendly, supra n. 30, at 146. 
\~tJ 
. .... ~· ~ . . . 
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habeas writ may, in theory, entitle the defendant only tore-
trial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete 
freedom from prosecution. 
Finally, the Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal 
system. The States possess primary authority for defining 
and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also 
hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional 
rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate 
both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and 
their good faith attempts to honor constitutional right . 32 
In Wainwright v. Sykes, we recognized that these costs 
are particularly high when a trial default has barred a pris-
oner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in 
the state courts. In that situation, the trial court has had no 
opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retri-
als. The defendant's counsel, for whatever reasons, has de-
tracted from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a 
claim in that forum. 33 The state appellate courts have not 
had a chance to mend their own fences and avoid federal in-
trusion. Issuance of a habeas writ, ~nally, exacts an extra 
charge by undercutting the State's ability to enforce its pro-
cedural rules. These considerations supported our Sykes 
ruling that, when a procedural default bars state litigation of 
a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal 
habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. 
,. ':_: •• 4_ •••• -.. • :. ·_:;;.,' : ••• 
32 During the last two decades, our constitutional jurisprudence has rec-
ognized numerous new rights for criminal defendants. Although some ha-
beas writs correct violations of long-established constitutional rights, oth-
ers vindicate more novel claims. State courts are understandably 
frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to 
have a federal court discover, during a § 2254 proceeding, new constitu-
tional commands. · 
33 Counsel's default may stem from simple ignorance or the pressures of 
trial. We noted in Sykes , however, that a defendant's counsel may delib-
erately choose to withhold a claim in order to "sandbag"-to gamble on ac-
quittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay off. 
See 433 U. S., at 89-90. 
·. 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.r.:)'"lt"~t t(,, ·-~ ,f f' ·'ll,~: '.:;,t, +~ ....­,.. • '+ • .. n "; .. • . . • l·. • ll. r . . .• r ·' ,... 'lJ • .::> 
';,hshil:.<.~~l1lt. 4., . ([. :20 ;Jl·c·j r \ ... ..... • c-
February 16, 1982 
Re: 80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac 
Dear Sandra, 
I had been inclined to reach the merits 
of the colorable constitutional issue you 
identify and to reverse on that question. I 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§ttpTttttt Q]omt cf t~t ~b ;§tattil 
~asfringhrn. ~. <!}. 20,?'1-$ 
February 16, 1982 
Re : No. 80 - 1430 - Engle v . Isaac 
Dear Sandra : 
I join . 
~ards , 
(1(20 
Justice O' Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
•' ,_ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
-----
.:§up-uutt <!Jonrl o-f tip· ~n:ii.c~ ~tau~ 
1)i'r~U'"J.riugto-n, 1fl. <!J. ZOe?'!~ 
Re: No. 80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac 
Dear Sandra: 
I 
March 11, 82 
You already have a Court for your opinion. You have my 
vote, too, if you could make the following changes. Most of 
them, I believe, are minor. 
l. Eliminate the word "initial" in the third line of 
footnote 26 on page 15. The presence of this word seems to me 
to suggest that the Sykes issue was raised sometime before the 
District Court. I believe that, in fact, the State did not 
present the issue until the case reached the Court of Appeals. 
2. In the same footnote you reject Bell's contention that 
the State waived its Sykes claim by presenting it for the fiist 
time before the Court of Appeals. According to the petitioner, 
however, Bell raises the State's waiver for the first time in 
this Court. Should not respondent's argument be answered on 
that grotmd rather for "prudential considerations"? It seems 
somewhat anomalous to permit the State to prevail on the argu-
ment that Bell failed to object at trial when the State itself 
is guilty of a similar default. 
3. Eliminate footnote 32 on page 18. 
4. Eliminate all of the text on page 23 except the last 
sentence. I believe that none of the respondents raises a 
Sixth Amendment claim. The material I suggest for deletion is 
therefore dictum. 
5. Eliminate the second sentence of the first paragraph 
on page 24. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
'o: The Chie:f Justice 
Justice Brennan ~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1430 
TED ENGLE, SUPERINTENDENT, CHILLICOTHE 
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE, PETITIONER, v. 
LINCOLN ISAAC 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1982] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), we held that a 
state prisoner, barred by procedural default from raising a 
constitutional claim on direct appeal, could not litigate that 
claim in a § 2254 habeas corpus1 proceeding without showing 
cause for and actual prejudice from the default. Applying 
the principle of Sykes to this case, we conclude that respon-
dents, who failed to comply with an Ohio rule mandating con-
temporaneous objections to jury instructions, may not chal-
lenge the constitutionality of those instructions in a federal 
habeas proceeding. 
I 
Respondents' claims rest in part on recent changes in Ohio 
criminal law. For over a century, the Ohio courts required 
criminal defendants to carry the burden of proving self-de-
1 Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) empowers "[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice 
thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court" to "entertain an application for 
a writ of .habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." This 
statutory remedy may not be identical in all respects to the common-law 
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fense by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. 
Seliskar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 95, 298 N. E. 2d 582 (1973); Szalkai 
v. State, 96 Ohio St. 36, 117 N. E. 12 (1917); Silvus v. State, 
22 Ohio St. 90 (1871). A new criminal code, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1974, subjected all affirmative defenses to the follow-
ing rule: 
"Every person accused of an offense is presumed inno-
cent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The bur-
den of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative 
defense is upon the accused." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2901.05(A) (1975). 
For more than two years after its enactment, most Ohio 
courts assumed that this section worked no change in Ohio's 
traditional burden-of-proof rules. 2 In 1976, however, the 
Ohio Supreme Court construed the statute to place only the 
burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, on the 
defendant. Once the defendant produces some evidence of 
self-defense, the state court ruled, the prosecutor must dis-
prove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rob-
inson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976) (syllabus by 
the court). 3 The present actions arose because Ohio tried 
2 See, e. g., State v. Rogers , 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 30,330 N. E. 2d 674,676 
(1975) (noting that "self-defense is an affirmative defense , which must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence"), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 
1061 (1976). But see State v. Matthews, No. 74AP-428, p. 9 (Ct. App. 
Franklin County, Ohio, Dec. 24, 1974) (§ 2901.05(A) "evinces a legislative 
intent to change the burden of the defendant with respect to affirmative 
defenses"); 1 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal Law and Practice 
§ 2901.05, p. 14 (1974 ed.) ("The provisions of 2901.05(A) follow the modern 
statutory trend in this area, requiring the accused to raise the affirmative 
defense, but leaving the burden of persuasion upon the prosecution. "); Stu-
dent Symposium: The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code-Reform and Regres-
sion, 33 Ohio St. L. J. 351, 420 (1972) (suggesting that legislators intended 
to change traditional rule). 
3 In Ohio, the court's syllabus contains the controlling law. See Haas 
80-1430---0PINION 
ENGLE v. ISAAC 3 
and convicted respondents after the effective date of 
§ 2901.05(A), but before the Ohio Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of that statute in Robinson. 4 
On December 16, 1974, an Ohio grand jury indicted respon-
dent Hughes for aggravated murder. 5 At trial the State 
showed that, in the presence of seven witnesses, Hughes 
shot and killed a man who was keeping company with his for-
mer girlfriend. Prosecution witnesses testified that the vic-
tim was unarmed and had just attempted to shake hands with 
Hughes. Hughes, however, claimed that he acted in self-de-
fense. His testimony suggested that he feared the victim, a 
larger man, because he had touched his pocket while ap-
proaching Hughes. The trial court instructed the jury that 
Hughes bore the burden of proving this defense by a prepon-
v. State, 103 Ohio St. 1, 7-8, 132 N. E. 158, 159-160 (1921). 
'Two years after Robinson, the Ohio legislature once again amended 
Ohio's burden of proof law. The new§ 2901.05(A), effective November 1, 
1978, provides: 
"Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements 
of the offense is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with 
the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the ac-
cused." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (Supp. 1980) (emphasis 
added). 
This amendment has no effect on the litigation before us. Thoughout this 
opinion, citations to § 2901. 05(A) refer to the statute in effect between Jan-
uary 1, 1974, and October 31, 1978. 
5 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01 (1975): 
"(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, 
cause the death of another. 
"(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while commit-
ting or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after commit-
ting or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, 
aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or 
escape. 
"(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated murder, and 
shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code." 
80-1430-0PINION 
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derance of the evidence. Counsel for Hughes did not specifi-
cally object to this instruction. 6 
On January 24, 1975, the jury convicted Hughes of volun-
tary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of aggravated 
murder. 7 On September 24, 1975, the Summit County 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and on March 19, 
1976, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Hughes' appeal, 
finding no substantial constitutional question. 8 Neither of 
these appeals challenged the jury instruction on self-defense. 
Ohio tried respondent Bell for aggravated murder in April 
1975. Evidence at trial showed that Bell was one of a group 
of bartenders who had agreed to help one another if trouble 
developed at any of their bars. On the evening of the mur-
der, one of the bartenders called Bell and told him that he 
feared trouble from five men who had entered his bar. 
When Bell arrived at the bar, the bartender informed him 
that the men had left. Bell pursued them and gunned one of 
the men down in the street. 
Bell defended on the ground that he had acted in self-de-
6 Hughes' counsel did register a general objection "to the entire Charge 
in its entirety" because "[w]e are operating now under a new code in which 
many things are uncertain." App. 48. Counsel's subsequent remarks, 
however, demonstrated that his objection concerned only the proposed def-
initions of "Aggravated Murder, Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter." 
App. 48, 50. 
7 Voluntary manslaughter is "knowingly caus[ing] the death of another" 
while under "extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provocation 
reasonably sufficient to incite [the Defendant] into using deadly force." 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.03 (A) (1975). 
Hughes was sentenced to 6-25 years in prison. The State's petition for 
certiorari indicated that Hughes has been "granted final releas[e] as a mat-
ter of parole." Pet. for Cert. 6. This release does not moot the contro-
versy between Hughes and the State. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 
504, 506-507 n. 2 (1972); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 237-240 
(1968). 
8 See State v. Hughes, C. A. No. 7717 (Ct. App. Summit County, Ohio, 
Sept. 24, 1975); State v. Hughes , No. 75--1026 (Ohio, March 19, 1976). 
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fense. He testified that as he approached two of the men, 
the bartender shouted: "He's got a gun" or "Watch out, he's 
got a gun." At this warning, Bell started shooting. As in 
Hughes' case, the trial court instructed the jury that Bell had 
the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Bell did not object to this instruction and the jury 
convicted him of murder, a lesser included offense of the 
charged crime. 9 
Bell appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, 
but failed to challenge the instruction assigning him the bur-
den of proving self-defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
Bell's conviction on April 8, 1976. 10 Bell appealed further to 
the Ohio Supreme Court, again neglecting to challenge the 
self-defense instruction. That court overruled his motion for 
leave to appeal on September 17, 1976," two months after it 
construed § 2901.05(A) to place the burden of proving ab-
sence of self-defense on the prosecution. See State v. Robin-
son, supra. 
Respondent Isaac was tried in September 1975 for feloni-
ous assault. 12 The State showed that Isaac had severely 
beaten his former wife's boyfriend. Isaac claimed that the 
boyfriend punched him first and that he acted solely in self-
defense. Without objection from Isaac, the court instructed 
9 Ohio defines murder as "purposely caus[ing] the death of another." 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.02(A) (1975). Bell received a sentence of 15 
years to life imprisonment. 
10 State v. Bell, No. 34727 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, April 8, 
1976). 
11 State v. Bell , No. 76-573 (Ohio, Sept. 17, 1976). 
12 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.11 (1975): 
"(A) No person shall knowingly: 
"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another; 
"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a 
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the 
Revised Code. 
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault, a felony 
of the second degree." 
'' 
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the jury that Isaac carried the burden of proving this defense 
by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury acquitted 
Isaac of felonious assault, but convicted him of the lesser in-
cluded offense of aggravated assault. 13 
Ten months after Isaac's trial, the Ohio Supreme Court de-
cided State v. Robinson, supra. In his appeal to the 
Pickaway County Court of Appeals, 14 Isaac relied upon Rob-
inson to challenge the burden of proof instructions given at 
his trial. The court rejected this challenge because Isaac 
had failed to object to the jury instructions during trial, as 
required by Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30. 15 This default waived 
13 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.12 (1975) describes aggravated assault: 
"(A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress brought on by se-
rious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force 
shall knowingly: 
"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another; 
"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a 
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the 
Revised Code. 
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated assault, a fel-
ony of the fourth degree." 
The judge sentenced Isaac to a term of six months to five years imprison-
ment. According to the State's petition for certiorari, Isaac has been re-
leased from jail. This controversy is not moot, however. Seen. 7, supra. 
14 State v. Isaac, No. 346 (Ct. App. Pickaway County, Ohio, Feb. 11, 
1977). 
15 At the time Hughes and Bell were tried, this rule stated in relevant 
part: 
"No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of 
the hearing of the jury." 
Shortly before Isaac's trial, Ohio amended the language of the rule in minor 
respects: 
"A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any 
instructions unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds 
80-1430-0PINION 
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Isaac's claim. State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N. E. 
2d 379 (1960); State v. Slone, 45 Ohio App. 2d 24, 340 N. E. 
2d 413 (1975). 
The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Isaac's appeal for 
lack of a substantial constitutional question. 16 On the same 
day, that court decided State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 
95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977), and State v. Williams, 51 Ohio 
St. 2d 112, 364 N. E. 2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part andre-
manded, 438 U. S. 911 (1978). In Humphries the court 
ruled that every criminal trial held on or after January 1, 
1974, "is required to be conducted in accordance with the pro-
visions of [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2901.05]." ld., at 95, 364 
N. E. 2d, at 1355 (syllabus by the court). The court, how-
ever, refused to extend this ruling to a defendant who failed 
to comply with Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30. ld., at 102-103, 
364 N. E. 2d, at 1359. In Williams, the court declined to 
consider a constitutional challenge to Ohio's traditional self-
defense instruction, again because the defendant had not 
properly objected to the instruction at trial. 
All three respondents unsuccessfully sought writs of ha-
beas corpus from federal district courts. Hughes' petition 
alleged that the State had violated the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by failing to prove guilt "as to each and every 
essential element of the offense charged" and by failing to "so 
instruct" the jury. The District Judge rejected this claim, 
finding that Ohio law does not consider absence of self-de-
fense an element of aggravated murder or voluntary man-
slaughter. Although the self-defense instructions at 
Hughes' trial might have violated § 2901.05(A), they did not 
violate the federal Constitution. Alternatively, the District 
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of 
the hearing of the jury." 
Both versions of the Ohio rule closely parallel Rule 30 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
16 State v. Isaac, No. 77-412 (Ohio, July 20, 1977). 
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Judge held that Hughes had waived his constitutional claim 
by failing to comply with Ohio's contemporaneous objection 
rule. Since Hughes offered no explanation for his failure to 
object, and showed no actual prejudice, Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), barred him from asserting the 
claim. Hughes v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C77-156A (N. D. 
Ohio, June 26, 1979). 
Bell's petition for habeas relief similarly alleged that the 
trial judge had violated due process by instructing "the jury 
that the accused must prove an affirmative defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence." The District Court acknowl-
edged that Bell had never raised this claim in the state 
courts. Observing, however, that the State addressed Bell's 
argument on the merits, the District Court ruled that Bell's 
default was not a "deliberate bypass." See Fay v. Noia, 372 
U. S. 391 (1963). Although the court cited our opinion in 
Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, it did not inquire whether Bell 
had shown cause for or prejudice from his procedural waiver. 
The court then ruled that Ohio could constitutionally burden 
Bell with proving self-defense since it had not defined ab-
sence of self-defense as an element of murder. Bell v. 
Perini, No. C 78-343 (N.D. Ohio, Dec. 26, 1978). 
Bell moved for reconsideration, urging that § 2901.05(A) 
had in fact defined absence of self-defense as an element of 
murder. The District Court rejected this argument and 
then declared that the "real issue" was whether Bell was en-
titled to retroactive application of State v. Robinson, supra. 
Bell failed on this claim as well since Ohio's decision to limit 
retroactive application of Robinson "substantially further[ed] 
the State's legitimate interest in the finality of its decisions." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. A59. Indeed, the District Court 
noted that this Court had sanctioned just this sort of limit on 
retroactivity. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 
233, 244 n. 8 (1977). Bell v. Perini, No. C 78-343 (N.D. 
Ohio, Jan. 23, 1979). 
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Isaac's habeas petition was more complex than those sub-
mitted by Hughes and Bell. He urged that the Ohio Su-
preme Court had "failed to give relief [to him], despite its 
own pronouncement" that State v. Robinson would apply ret-
roactively. In addition, h~ declared broadly that the Ohio 
court's ruling was "contrary to the Supreme Court of the 
United States in regard to proving self-defense." The Dis-
trict Court determined that Isaac had waived any constitu-
tional claims by failing to present them to the Ohio trial 
court. Since he further failed to show either cause for or ac-
tual prejudice from the waiver, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 
supra, he could not present his claim in a federal habeas pro-
ceeding. Isaac v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C-2-78-278 (S.D. 
Ohio, June 26, 1978). 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed all 
three District Court orders. In Isaac v. Engle, 646 F. 2d 
1129 (CA6 1980), a majority of the en bane court ruled that 
Wainwright v. Sykes did not preclude consideration of Isaac's 
constitutional claims. At the time of Isaac's trial, the court 
noted, Ohio had consistently required defendants to prove af-
firmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
futility of objecting to this established practice supplied ade-
quate cause for Isaac's waiver. Prejudice, the second pre-
requisite for excusing a procedural default, was "clear" since 
the burden of proof is a critical element of factfinding, and 
since Isaac had made a substantial issue of self-defense. I d., 
at 1134. 
A majority of the court also believed that the instructions 
given at Isaac's trial violated due process. Four judges 
thought that § 2901.05(A) defined the absence of self-defense 
as an element of felonious and aggravated assault. While 
the State did not have to define its crimes in this manner, 
"due process require[d] it to meet the burden that it chose to 
assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135. A fifth judge believed that, 
even absent§ 2901.05(A), the Due Process Clause would com-
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pel the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense because 
that defense negates criminal intent, an essential element of 
aggravated and felonious assault. A sixth judge agreed that 
Ohio had violated Isaac's due process rights, but would have 
concentrated on the State's arbitrary refusal to extend the 
retroactive benefits of State v. Robinson, supra, to Isaac. 17 
Relying on the en bane decision in Isaac, two Sixth Circuit 
panels ordered the District Court to release Bell and Hughes 
unless the State chose to retry them within a reasonable 
time. Bell v. Perini, 635 F. 2d 575 (CA6 1980);'8 Hughes v. 
Engle, judgment order reported at 642 F. 2d 451 (CA6 1980). 
We granted certiorari to review all three Sixth Circuit opin-
ions. 451 U. S. 906 (1981). 
II 
A state prisoner is entitled to relief under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2254 only if he is held "in custody in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Insofar 
as respondents simply challenge the correctness of the self-
defense instructions under Ohio law, they allege no depriva-
tion of federal rights and may not obtain habeas relief. The 
lower courts, however, read respondents' habeas petitions to 
state at least two constitutional claims. Respondents repeat 
both of those claims here. 
A 
First, respondents argue that § 2901.05, which governs the 
burden of proof in all criminal trials, implicitly designated ab-
sence of self-defense an element of the crimes charged 
"The latter analysis paralleled the reasoning of the panel that originally 
decided the case. See Isaac v. Engle, 646 F. 2d 1122 (CA6 1980). 
Four members of the court dissented from the en bane opinion. Two 
judges would have found no constitutional violation and two would have 
barred consideration of Isaac's claims under Wainwright v. Sykes, supra. 
18 One judge dissented from this decision, indicating that Wainwright v. 
Sykes, supra, barred Bell's claims. 
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against them. Since Ohio defined its crimes in this manner, 
respondents contend, our opinions in In re Winship, 397 
U. S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), 
and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977), require the 
prosecution to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reason-
able doubt. A plurality of the en bane Sixth Circuit seemed 
to accept this argument in Isaac's appeal, finding that due 
process required the State "to meet the burden that it chose 
to assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135. 
A careful review of our prior decisions reveals that this 
claim is without merit. 19 Our opinions suggest that the pros-
ecution's constitutional duty to negate affirmative defenses 
may depend, at least in part, on the manner in which the 
State defines the charged crime. Compare Mullaney v. Wil-
bur, supra, with Patterson v. New York, supra. These deci-
sions, however, do not suggest that whenever a State re-
quires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably defined that cir-
cumstance as an element of the crime. · A State may want to 
assume the burden of disproving an affirmative defense with-
out also designating absence of the defense an element of the 
crime. 20 The Due Process Clause does not mandate that 
19 The State suggests that the ineffectiveness of this claim demonstrates 
that respondents suffered no actual prejudice from their procedural de-
fault. We agree that the claim is insufficient to support habeas relief, but 
do not categorize this insufficiency as a lack of prejudice. If a state pris-
oner alleges no deprivation of a federal right-, § 2254 is simply inapplicable. 
It is unnecessary in such a situation to inquire whether the prisoner pre-
served his claim before the state courts. 
20 Definition of a crime's elements may have consequences under state 
law other than allocation of the burden of persuasion. For example, the 
Ohio Supreme Court interpreted § 2901.05(A) to require defendants to 
come forward with some evidence of affirmative defenses. State v. Robin-
son, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976). Defendants do not bear 
the same burden with respect to the elements of a crime; the State must 
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt even when the defendant 
introduces no evidence. See, e. g., State v. Isaac, 44 Ohio Misc. 87, 337 N. 
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when a State treats absence of an "affirmative defense" as an 
"element" of the crime for one purpose, it must do so for all 
purposes. The structure of Ohio's Code suggests simply 
that the State decided to assist defendants by requiring the 
prosecution to disprove certain affirmative defenses. Ab-
sent concrete evidence that the Ohio legislature or courts un-
derstood § 2901.05(A) to go further than this, we decline to 
accept respondents' construction of state law. While they 
attempt to cast their first claim in constitutional terms, we 
believe that this claim does no more than suggest that the in-
structions at respondents' trials may have violated state 
law. 21 
B 
Respondents also allege that, even without considering 
§ 2901.05, Ohio could not constitutionally shift the burden of 
proving self-defense to them. All of the crimes charged 
against them require a showing of purposeful or knowing be-
havior. These terms, according to respondents, imply a de-
gree of culpability that is absent when a person acts in self-
defense. See Committee Comment to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2901.21 (1975) ("generally, an offense is not committed un-
less a person . . . has a certain guilty state of mind at the 
E. 2d 818 (Munic. Ct. 1975). Moreover, while Ohio requires the trial court 
to charge the jury on all elements of a crime, e. g., State v. Bridgeman, 51 
Ohio App. 2d 105, 366 N. E. 2d 1378 (1977), vacated in part, 55 Ohio St. 2d 
261, 381 N. E. 2d 184 (1978), it does not require explicit instructions on the 
prosecution's duty to negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Abner, 55 Ohio St. 2d 251, 379 N. E. 2d 228 (1978). 
21 We have long recognized that a "mere error of state law" is not a de-
nial of due process. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 731 (1948). If the 
contrary were true, then "every erroneous decision by a state court on 
state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question." 
Ibid. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 554-555 (1962); Bishop 
v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F. 2d 724, 726 (CA3 1980); United States ex rel. Bur-
nett v. Illinois, 619 F. 2d 668, 670--671 (CA7 1980). 
\ ·,, 
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time of his act or failure [to act]"); State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio 
App. 2d 284, 286-287, 290 N. E. 2d 921, 923 (1972) ("one who 
kills in self-defense does so without the mens rea that other-
wise would render him culpable of the homicide"). In addi-
tion, Ohio punishes only actions that are voluntary, Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.21(A)(l) (1975), and unlawful, State v. 
Simon, No. 6262, p. 13 (Ct. App. Montgomery County, Ohio, 
Jan. 16, 1980), modified on reconsideration (Jan. 22, 1980). 
Self-defense, respondents urge, negates these elements of 
criminal behavior. Therefore, once the defendant raises the 
possibility of self-defense, respondents contend that the 
State must disprove that defense as part of its task of estab-
lishing guilty mens rea, voluntariness, and unlawfulness. 
The Due Process Clause, according to respondents' interpre-
tation of Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson, forbids the 
States from disavowing any portion of this burden. 22 
This argument states a colorable constitutional claim. 
Several courts have applied our Mullaney and Patterson 
opinions to charge the prosecution with the constitutional 
duty of proving absence of self-defense. 23 Most of these deci-
22 In further support of the claim that, § 2901.05 aside, due process re-
quires the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense, respondent Bell 
maintains that the States may not constitutionally punish actions taken in 
self-defense. If fundamental notions of due process prohibit 
criminalization of actions taken in self-defense, Bell suggests, then absence 
of self-defense is a vital element of every crime. See Jeffries & Stephan, 
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale 
L. J. 1325, 1366-1379 (1979); Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proving 
Self-Defense-With Analysis of Related Ohio Law, 11 Akron L. Rev. 717, 
758-759 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of Affinnative Defenses After 
Patterson v. New York, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 655, 672-673 (1978); Note, Bur-
dens of Persuasion in Criminal Proceedings: The Reasonable Doubt Stan-
dard After Patterson v. New York, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev. 385, 415-416 (1979). 
23 E. g., Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F. 2d 161 (CA5 1981); Holloway v. 
McElroy, 632 F. 2d 605 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 1028 (1981); 
Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F. 2d 448 (CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 950 (1979); 
Commonwealth v. Hilbert, 476 Pa. 288, 382 A. 2d 724 (1978). See also 
Comment, 11 Akron L. Rev., supra n. 22; Note, 78 Colum. L. Rev., supra 
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sions adopt respondents' reasoning that due process com-
mands the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense if that 
defense negates an element, such as purposeful conduct, of 
the charged crime. While other courts have rejected this 
type of claim, 24 the controversy suggests that respondents' 
second argument states at least a plausible constitutional 
claim. We proceed, therefore, to determine whether re-
spondents preserved this claim before the state courts and, if 
not, to inquire whether the principles articulated in Wain-
wright v. Sykes, supra, bar consideration of the claim in a 
federal habeas proceeding. 25 
n. 22. 
24 E. g., Carter v. Jago, 637 F. 2d 449 (CA6 1980); Baker v. Muncy, 619 
F. 2d 327 (CA4 1980). See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952) I 
(rule requiring accused to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt does 
not violate due process). 
25 As we recognized in Sykes, 433 U. S., at 78-79, the problem of waiver 
is separate from the question whether a state prisoner has exhausted state 
remedies. Section 2254(b) requires habeas applicants to exhaust those 
remedies "available in the courts of the State." This requirement, how-
ever, refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal peti-
tion. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 516 (1972); Fay v. Noia, 372 
U. S. 391, 435 (1963). Respondents, of course, long ago completed their 
direct appeals. Ohio, moreover, provides only limited collateral review of 
convictions; prisoners may not raise claims that could have been litigated 
before judgment or on direct appeal. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2953.21(A) (1975); Collins v. Perini, 594 F. 2d 592 (CA6 1979); Keener v. 
Ridenour, 594 F. 2d 581 (CA6 1979). Since respondents could have chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Ohio's traditional self-defense instruction at 
trial or on direct appeal, we agree with the lower courts that state collat-
eral relief is unavailable to respondents and, therefore, that they have ex-
hausted their state remedies with respect to this claim. 
In addition to the claims discussed in text, respondents contend that 
Ohio's failure to apply State v. Robinson retroactively to them violates the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Respondents' due process 
claim asserts that Ohio has no rational reason for refusing to apply Robin-
son to all defendants tried after the effective date of§ 2901.05(A). Their 
equal protection claim rests on the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court has 
applied Robinson retroactively to defendants convicted in nonjury trials, 
even when those defendants raised no burden-of-proof objection at trial. 
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III 
None of the respondents challenged the constitutionality of 
the self-defense instruction at trial. 26 They thus violated 
Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30, which requires contemporaneous 
objections to jury instructions. Failure to comply with Rule 
30 is adequate, under Ohio law, to bar appellate consideration 
of an objection. See, e. g., State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 
2d 95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977); State v. Gordon, 28 Ohio St. 
2d 45, 276 N. E. 2d 243 (1971). The Ohio Supreme Court has 
enforced this bar against the very due process argument 
raised here. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St. 2d 112, 364 N. 
E. 2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part and remanded, 438 U. S. 
See State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977). 
We do not believe respondents' habeas petitions fairly raise either of 
these claims. In particular, we find no trace of the equal protection argu-
ment in any of the proceedings below. We note, moreover, that respon- \ 
dents may not have properly exhausted available state remedies for these 
claims. Respondents could not have known the type of retroactivity Ohio 
would accord State v. Robinson until the Ohio Supreme Court decided 
Humphries, supra. The latter decision was rendered on the same day 
that the court refused to review Isaac's direct appeal and long after the 
convictions of Bell and Hughes became final. Accordingly, respondents 
did not have the opportunity on direct appeal to confront the Ohio courts 
with the equal protection and due process problems Humphries allegedly 
creates. Nor did the Ohio Supreme Court consider those problems in 
Humphries. Under these circumstances, Ohio might allow respondents to 
raise their equal protection and due process claims in a collateral proceed- \ 
ing. Because respondents' petitions do not clearly raise either of these is-
sues, and because respondents may not have exhausted available state 
remedies for those claims, we decline to address them at this time. 
26 While respondent Bell does not deny his procedural default, he argues 
that we should overlook it because the State did not raise the issue in its 
filings with the District Court. In some cases a State's plea of default may 
come too late to bar consideration of the prisoner's constitutional claim. 
E. g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 n. 12 (1981); Jenkins v. Ander-
son, 447 U. S. 231, 234 n. 1 (1980). In this case, however, both the Dis-
trict urt and Court o ppeals evaluated Bell's default. Bell, moreover, ' 
did not make IS waiver' claim until he submitted his brief on the merits 
to this Court. Accordingly, we decline to consider his argument. 
• ;>• 
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911 (1978). 27 We must determine, therefore, whether re-
spondents may litigate, in a federal habeas proceeding, a con-
stitutional claim that they forfeited before the state courts. 
A 
The writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored 
position in our jurisprudence. Tracing its roots deep into 
English common law, 28 it claims a place in Article I of our 
Constitution.29 Today, as in prior centuries, the writ is a 
bulwark against convictions that violate "fundamental fair-
ness." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 97 (STEVENS, J., 
concurring). 
We have always recognized, however, that the Great Writ 
entails significant costs. 3° Collateral review of a conviction 
27 In Isaac's own case, the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to entertain his 
challenge to the self-defense instruction because of his failure to comply 
with Rule 30. The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Isaac's 
appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question. It is unclear 
whether these appeals raised a constitutional, or merely statutory, attack 
on the self-defense instruction used at Isaac's trial. If Isaac presented his 
constitutional argument to the state courts, then they determined, on the 
very facts before us, that the claim was waived. 
Relying upon State v. Long, 53 Ohio St. 2d 91, 372 N. E. 2d 804 (1978), 
respondents argue that the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized its power, 
under Ohio's plain-error rule, to excuse Rule 30 defaults. Long, however, 
does not persuade us that the Ohio courts would have excused respondents' 
defaults. First, the Long court stressed that the plain-error rule applies 
only in "exceptional circumstances," such as where, "but for the error, the 
outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise." !d., at 96, 97, 
372 N. E. 2d, at 807, 808. Second, the Long decision itself refused to in-
voke the plain-error rule for a defendant who presented a constitutional 
claim identical to the one pressed by respondents. 
28 See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129-*138; Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A. C. 603 (H. 1.). 
29 Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
30 Judge Henry J. Friendly put the matter well when he wrote that 
"[t]he proverbial man from Mars would surely think we must consider our 
system of criminal justice terribly bad if we are willing to tolerate such ef-
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extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused. 
As Justice Harlan once observed, "[b]oth the individual crim-
inal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that 
there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an 
end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused 
not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on 
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the 
community." Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Hankerson v. North Caro-
lina, 432 U. S. 233, 247 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment). By frustrating these interests, the writ under-
mines the usual principles of finality of litigation. 31 
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the 
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates 
society's resources at one "time and place in order to decide, 
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or 
forts at undoing judgments of conviction." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 
145 (1970). 
JUSTICE POWELL, elucidating a position that ultimately commanded a ma-
jority of the Court, similarly suggested: 
"No effective judicial system can afford to concede the continuing theo-
retical possibility that there is error in every trial and that every incarcera-
tion is unfounded. At some point the law must convey to those in custody 
that a wrong has been committed, that consequent punishment has been 
imposed, that one should no longer look back with the view to resurrecting 
every imaginable basis for further litigation but rather should look forward 
to rehabilitation and to becoming a constructive citizen." Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (POWELL, J ., concurring) (footnote 
omitted). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). 
31 Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this absence of final-
ity also frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation. Deterrence depends 
upon the expectation that "one violating the law will swiftly and certainly 
become subject to punishment, just punishment." Rehabilitation de-
mands that the convicted defendant realize "that he is justly subject to 
sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation." Bator, Finality in 
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. 
Rev. 441, 452 (1963); Friendly, supra n. 30, at 146. 
• I ' 
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innocence." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 90. Our Con-
stitution and laws surround the trial with a multitude of pro-
tections for the accused. Rather than enhancing these safe-
guards, ready availability of habeas corpus may diminish 
their sanctity by suggesting to the trial participants that 
there may be no need to adhere to those safeguards during 
the trial itself. 
We must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus fre-
quently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders. 
Passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of wit-
nesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible. While a 
habeas writ may, in theory, entitle the defendant only to re-
trial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete 
freedom from prosecution. 
Finally, the Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal 
system. The States possess primary authority for defining 
and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also 
hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional 
rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate 
both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and 
their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. See l 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 263-265 (1973) 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 32 
In Wainwright v. Sykes, we recognized that these costs 
are particularly high when a trial default has barred a pris-
oner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in 
the state courts. In that situation, the trial court has had no 
opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retri-
als. The defendant's counsel, for whatever reasons, has de-
32 During the last two decades, our constitutional jurisprudence has rec-
ognized numerous new rights for criminal defendants. Although some ha-
beas writs correct violations of long-established constitutional rights, oth-
ers vindicate more novel claims. State courts are understandably 
frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to 
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tracted from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a 
claim in that forum. 33 The state appellate courts have not 
had a chance to mend their own fences and avoid federal in-
trusion. Issuance of a habeas writ, finally, exacts an extra 
charge by undercutting the State's ability to enforce its pro-
cedural rules. These considerations supported our Sykes 
ruling that, when a procedural default bars state litigation of 
a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal 
habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. 
Respondents urge that we should limit Sykes to cases in 
which the constitutional error did not affect the truthfinding 
function of the trial. In Sykes itself, for example, the pris-
oner alleged that the State had violated the rights guaran-
teed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). While 
this defect was serious, it did not affect the determination of 
guilt at trial. 
We do not believe, however, that the principles of Sykes 
lend themselves to this limitation. The costs outlined above 
do not depend upon the type of claim raised by the prisoner. 
While the nature of a constitutional claim may affect the cal-
culation of cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the 
need to make that threshold showing. We reaffirm, there-
fore, that any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the 
federal courthouse after a state procedural default must dem-
onstrate cause and actual prejudice before obtaining relief. 
B 
Respondents seek cause for their defaults in two circum-
stances. First, they urge that they could not have known at 
the time of their trials that the Due Process Clause addresses 
33 Counsel's default may stem from simple ignorance or the pressures of 
trial. We noted in Sykes , however, that a defendant's counsel may delib-
erately choose to withhold a claim in order to "sandbag"-to gamble on ac-
quittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay off. 
See 433 U. S., at 89-90. 
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the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Second, they 
contend that any objection to Ohio's self-defense instruction 
would have been futile since Ohio had long required criminal 
defendants to bear the burden of proving this affirmative 
defense. 
We note at the outset that the futility of presenting an 
objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for 
a failure to object at trial. If a defendant perceives a con- f 
stitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the federal 
courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because he 
thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim.34 Even a 
state court that has previously rejected a constitutional argu-
ment may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is 
valid. Allowing criminal defendants to deprive the state 
courts of this opportunity would contradict the principles 
supporting Sykes. 35 
Respondents' claim, however, is not simply one of futility. 
They further allege that, at the time they were tried, they 
could not know that Ohio's self-defense instructions raised 
constitutional questions. A criminal defendant, they urge, 
may not waive constitutional objections unknown at the time 
of trial. 
We need not decide whether the novelty of a constitutional 
claim ever establishes cause for a failure to object. 36 We 
34 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 515 (1976) (POWELL, J., con-
curring) (the policy disfavoring inferred waivers of constitutional rights 
"need not be carried to the length of allowing counsel for a defendant delib-
erately to forgo objection to a curable trial defect, even though he is aware 
of the factual and legal basis for an objection, simply because he thought 
objection would be futile") ; Myers v. Washington, 646 F . 2d 355, 364 (CA9 
1981) (Poole, J., dissenting) (futility cannot constitute cause if it means 
simply that a claim was "unacceptable to that particular court at that par-
ticular time"), cert. pending, No. 81-1056. 
35 In fact, the decision to withhold a known constitutional claim resem-
bles the type of deliberate bypass condemned in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963). Since the cause and prejudice standard is more demanding than 
Fay's deliberate bypass requirement, see Sykes , supra, at 87, we are confi-
dent that perceived futility alone cannot constitute cause. 
36 The State stressed at oral argument before this Court that it does not 
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might hesitate to adopt a rule that would require trial counsel 
either to exercise extraordinary vision or to object to every 
aspect of the proceedings in the hope that some aspect might 
mask a latent constitutional claim. On the other hand, later 
discovery of a constitutional defect unknown at the time of 
trial does not invariably render the original trial funda-
mentally unfair. 37 These concerns, however, need not detain 
us here since respondents' claims were far from unknown at 
the time of their trials. 
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), decided four-and-one-
half years before the first of respondents' trials, laid the basis 
for their constitutional claim. In Winship we held that "the 
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 
I d., at 364. During the five years following this decision, 38 
dozens of defendants relied upon this language to challenge 
the constitutionality of rules requiring them to bear a burden 
seek such a ruling. Instead, Ohio urges merely that "when the tools are 
available to construct the argument, ... you can charge counsel with the 
obligation of raising that argument." Transcript at 8-9. 
37 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 67&-702 (1971) (separate 
opinion of Harlan, J.); Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 661>-666 
(1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 246-248 (1977) (POWELL, J. , 
concurring in the judgment). 
38 Even before Winship, criminal defendants and courts perceived that 
placing a burden of proof on the defendant may violate due process. For 
example, in Stump v. Bennett, 398 F. 2d 111 (CA8 1968), cert. denied , 393 
U. S. 1001 (1968), the Eighth Circuit ruled en bane that an Iowa rule re-
quiring defendants to prove alibis by a preponderance of the evidence vio-
lated due process. The court, moreover, observed: "That an oppressive 
shifting of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant violates due process 
is not a new doctrine within constitutional law." ld., at 122. See also 
Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U. S. 253 (1968) (vacating and remanding lower 
court decision for reconsideration in light of Stump); State v. Nales, 28 
Conn. Supp. 28, 248 A. 2d 242 (1968) (holding that due process forbids re-
quiring defendant to prove "lawful excuse" for possession of housebreaking 
tools). 
. . '. 
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of proof. 39 In most of these cases, the defendants' claims 
countered well-established principles of law. Nevertheless, 
numerous courts agreed that the Due Process Clause re-
quires the prosecution to bear the burden of disproving cer-
39 See, e. g., State v. Commenos, 461 S. W. 2d 9 (Mo. 1970) (en bane) 
(intent to return allegedly stolen item); Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 475 
P. 2d 671 (1970) (insanity), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 940 (1971); Common-
wealth v. O'Neal, 441 Pa. 17, 271 A. 2d 497 (1970) (absence of malice); 
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A. 2d 89 (1970) (insanity), over-
ruled, Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A. 2d 880 (1974); Smith v. 
Smith, 454 F. 2d 572 (CA5 1971) (alibi), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 885 (1972); 
United States v. Braver, 450 F. 2d 799 (CA2 1971) (inducement), cert. de-
nied, 405 U. S. 1064 (1972); Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (Me. 
1972) (heat of passion), aff'd sub nom. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F. 2d 943 
(CAl 1973), vacated, 414 U. S. 1139 (1974), on remand, 496 F. 2d 1303 
(CA11974), aff'd, 421 U. S. 684 (1975); State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 
P. 2d 322 (1971) (lack of malice aforethought or presence of legal justifica-
tion); State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 301 A. 2d 547 (1972) (possession of li-
cense to deal in drugs), overruled on other grounds, State v. Whistnant, 
179 Conn. 576, 427 A. 2d 414 (1980); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P. 2d 
1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (en bane) (entrapment); Woods v. State, 233 
Ga. 347, 211 S. E. 2d 300 (1974) (authority to sell narcotic drugs), appeal 
dismissed, 422 U. S. 1002 (1975); State v. Buzynski, 330 A. 2d 422 (Me. 
1974) (mental disease); People v. Jordan, 51 Mich. App. 710, 216 N. W. 2d 
71 (1974) (absence of intent), disapproved on other grounds, People v. 
Johnson, 407 Mich. 196, 284 N. W. 2d 718 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rose, 
457 Pa. 380, 321 A. 2d 880 (1974) (intoxication); Retail Credit Co. v. Dade 
County, 393 F. Supp. 577 (SD Fla. 1975) (maintenance of reasonable proce-
dures); Fuentes v. State, 349 A. 2d 1 (Del. 1975) (extreme emotional dis-
tress), overruled, State v. Moyer, 387 A. 2d 194 (Del. 1978); Henderson v. 
State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S. E. 2d 612 (1975) (self-defense); State v. Grady, 
276 Md. 178, 345 A. 2d 436 (1975) (alibi); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 
349 A. 2d 300 (1975) (absence of malice; further describing in detail that 
due process requires prosecution to negate most affirmative defenses, in-
cluding self-defense), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A. 2d 629 (1976); State v. Rob-
inson, 48 Ohio App. 2d 197, 356 N. E. 2d 725 (1975) (self-defense), aff'd, 47 
Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976). See also Trimble v. State, 229 Ga. 
399, 191 S. E. 2d 857 (1972) (alibi), overruled, Patterson v. State, 233 Ga. 
724, 213 S. E. 2d 612 (1975); Grace v. State, 231 Ga. 113, 118, 125-128, 200 
S. E. 2d 248, 252, 256-258 (1973) (dissenting opinions) (insanity) . 
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tain affirmative defenses. 40 In light of this activity, we can-
not say that respondents lacked the tools to construct their 
constitutional claim. 41 
We do not suggest that every astute counsel would have l 
relied upon Winship to assert the unconstitutionality of a rule 
saddling criminal defendants with the burden of proving an 
affirmative defense. Every trial presents a myriad of possi-
ble claims. Counsel might have chosen to omit or over- ~ 
looked respondents' due process argument while pursuing 
other avenues of defense. We have long recognized, how-
ever, that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 
only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure 
that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceiv-
Several commentators also perceived that Winship might alter tradi-
tional burdens of proof for affirmative defenses. E. g., W. LaFave & A. 
Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 8, pp. 46-51 (1972); The Supreme 
Court 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 159 (1970); Student Symposium, 33 
Ohio St. L. J., supra n. 2, at 421; Comment, Due Process and Supremacy 
as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism After 
Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 U. Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974). 
40 Even those decisions rejecting the defendant's claim, of course, show 
that the issue had been perceived by other defendants and that it was a live 
one in the courts at the time. 
41 Respondent Isaac even had the benefit of our opinion in Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, supra, decided three months before his trial. In Mullaney we in-
validated a Maine practice requiring criminal defendants to negate malice 
by proving that they acted in the heat of passion. We thus explicitly ac-
knowledged the link between Winship and constitutional limits on assign-
ment of the burden of proof. Cf. Lee v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 461, 462 
(1979) (per curiam) (suggesting that defendants who failed, after Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), to object to the exclusion of women from 
juries must show cause for the failure). 
Respondents argue at length that, before the Ohio Supreme Court's de-
cision in State v. Robinson, supra, they did not know that Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2901.05(A) changed the traditional burden of proof. Ohio's inter-
pretation of§ 2901.05(A), however, is relevant only to claims that we reject 
independently of respondents' procedural default. See supra, at 10-12; 
n. 25, supra. 
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able constitutional claim. Where the basis of a constitutional 
claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived 
and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality 
counsel against labelling alleged unawareness of the objection 
as cause for a procedural default. 42 
c 
Respondents, finally, urge that we should replace or sup-
plement the cause-and-prejudice standard with a plain-error 
inquiry. We rejected this argument when pressed by a fed-
eral prisoner, see United States v. Frady, No. 80-1595, and 
find it no more compelling here. The federal courts apply a 
plain-error rule for direct review of federal convictions. 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). Federal habeas challenges to 
state convictions, however, entail greater finality problems 
and special comity concerns. We remain convinced that the 
burden of justifying federal habeas relief for state prisoners 
is "greater than the showing required to establish plain error 
on direct appeal." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154 
(1977); United States v. Frady, supra, at --.43 
42 Respondents resist this conclusion by noting that Hankerson v. North 
Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 243 (1977), gave Mullaney v. Wilbur, the opinion 
explicitly recognizing Winship's effect on affirmative defenses, "complete 
retroactive effect." Hankerson itself, however, acknowledged the distinc-
tion between the retroactive availability of a constitutional decision and the 
right to claim that availability after a procedural default. JUSTICE WHITE's 
majority opinion forthrightly suggested that the States "may be able to in-
sulate past convictions [from the effect of Mullaney] by enforcing the nor-
mal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of 
any claim of error." 432 U. S., at 244 n. 8. In this case we accept the 
force of that language as applied to defendants tried after Winship. 
Since we conclude that these respondents lacked cause for their default, 
we do not consider whether they also suffered actual prejudice. Respon-
dents urge that their prejudice was so great that it should permit relief 
even in the absence of cause. Sykes, however, stated these criteria in the 
conjunctive and the facts of this case do not persuade us to depart from 
that approach. 
43 Respondents bolster their plain-error contention by observing that 
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Contrary to respondents' assertion, moreover, a plain-er-
ror standard is unnecessary to correct miscarriages of jus-
tice. The terms "cause" and "actual prejudice" are not rigid 
concepts; they take their meaning from the principles of co-
mity and finality discussed above. In appropriate cases 
those principles must yield to the imperative of a funda-
mentally unjust incarceration. Since we are confident that 
victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the 
cause-and-prejudice standard, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 
supra, at 91; id., at 94-97 (STEVENS, J., concurring), we de-
cline to adopt the more vague inquiry suggested by the words 
"plain error." 
IV 
Close analysis of respondents' habeas petitions reveals only 
one colorable constitutional claim. Because respondents 
failed to comply with Ohio's procedures for raising that con-
tention, and because they have not demonstrated cause for 
the default, they are barred from asserting that claim under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The judgments of the Court of Appeals 
are reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
So ordered. 
Ohio will overlook a procedural default if the trial defect constituted plain 
error. Ohio, however, has declined to exercise this discretion to review 
the type of claim pressed here. Seen. 27, supra. If Ohio had exercised 
its discretion to consider respondents' claim, then their initial default 
would no longer block federal review. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, at 
688 n. 7; County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 147-154 
(1979). Our opinions, however, make clear that the States have the pri-
mary responsibility to interpret and apply their plain error-rules. Cer-
tainly we should not rely upon a state plain-error rule when the State has 
refused to apply that rule to the very sort of claim at issue. 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[March - , 1982] 
, dissenting. 
hr'<......t.D'I"TT' :r"wn is a conspicuous exercise in judicial activ-
ism. In its eagerness to expatiate upon the "significant 
costs" of the Great Writ, ante, at 16-18, and to apply "the 
principles articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes," 433 U. S. 72 
(1977), ante, at 14, to the cases before us, the Court de-
monstrably misreads and reshapes the habeas claim of at 
least one of the state prisoners involved in this action. Re-
spondent Isaac presented exactly one claim in his habeas pe-
tition. That claim did not even exist until after Isaac was de-
nied relief on his last direct appeal. As a result, Isaac could 
not have "preserved" his claim in the state courts: He simply 
committed no "procedural default, " and the Court is thus 
clearly wrong to apply Sykes to his claim in order to relegate 
it to the dustbin. The Court then compounds its error when 
it attempts to articulate the "principles" of Sykes: In purport-
ing to give content to the "cause" standard announced in that 
case, the Court defines "cause" in a way supported neither by 
Sykes nor by common sense. I dissent from both of these 
errors, which are discussed in turn below. 
I 
Respondent Isaac was indicted in May 1975; he was con-
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it to the dustbin. The Court then compounds its error when 
it attempts to articulate the "principles" of Sykes: In purport-
ing to give content to the "cause" standard announced in that 
case, the Court defines "cause" in a way supported neither by 
Sykes nor by common sense. I dissent from both of these 
errors, which are discussed in turn below. 
I 
Respondent Isaac was indicted in May 1975; he was con-
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victed after a jury trial and sentenced during the following 
September. 1 While his conviction was on appeal in the Ohio 
Court of Appeals, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. 
Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (July 1976), 
which construed Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (effective 
January 1, 1974) to require the prosecution to bear the bur-
den of persuasion, beyond a reasonable doubt, with respect 
to an affirmative defense of self-defense raised by the defend-
ant. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Isaac's conviction 
in February 1977. 2 The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed 
Isaac's appeal in July 1977.3 On the same day, the Ohio Su-
preme Court decided State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 
364 N. E. 2d 1354. That case declared Robinson retroactive 
to the effective date of § 2901.05(A), but only partially: It 
held that in order to gain the retroactive benefits of the Rob-
inson decision, a defendant tried before a jury must have 
preserved his claim by objection at trial to the allocation of 
the affirmative-defense burden of proof, while a bench-trial 
defendant could have made the same objection as late as in 
the court of appeals, and the objection would still have been 
preserved. 51 Ohio St. 2d, at 102-103, 364 N. E. 2d, at 
1359. 
Isaac filed his habeas petition in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio in March 1978.4 The 
asserted ground for relief was "denial of due process of law," 
in that 
"The trial court charged petitioner had the burden of 
proving self-defense. After conviction and during the 
first appeal the Ohio Supreme Court declared the in-
structions to be prejudicial error under Robinson. This 
1 App. 2; Appendix to Brief in No. 78--3488, Isaac v. Engle (CA6), pp. 2, 
3-4. 
2 App. 6. 
3 App. 13. 
' Appendix to Brief in No. 78--3488, Isaac v. Engle (CA6), p. 18. 
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case was immediately raised to the Appellate Court. 
They held any error was waived. The Ohio Supreme 
Court then held Robinson retroactive. Petitioner had 
raised retroactivity in its leave to appeal and was denied 
leave to appeal the same day Humphries was decided de-
claring retroactivity. The Ohio Supreme Court refuses 
to give relief despite its own pronouncement. The hold-
ing of the court is contrary to the Supreme Court of the 
United States in regard to proving self-defense." 5 
Isaac's memorandum in support of his habeas petition made it 
plain that his claim was that Humphries' selective retroactive 
application of the Robinson rule denied him due process of 
law. 6 It is obvious, of course, that it was simply impossible 
to make this claim before Humphries was decided, in July 
1977, on the same day that Isaac's direct appeals in the state 
court system were finally rejected. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2953.21(A) provides for post-
conviction relief under certain circumstances: 
"Any person convicted of a criminal offense ... claiming 
that there was such a denial or infringement of his rights 
as to render the judgment void or voidable under the 
Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United . 
States, may file a verified petition at any time in the 
court which imposed sentence, stating the grounds of re-
lief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set 
aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other appro-
priate relief." 
By applying the doctrine of res judicata to postconviction pe-
titions, the Ohio Supreme Court has allowed relief under this 
procedure only under limited circumstances: Constitutional 
issues can be raised under § 2953.21(A) only when they could 
not have been raised at trial or on appeal. State v. Perry, 10 
6 Id., at p. 21 (emphasis added). 
6 !d., at p. 25. 
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Ohio St. 2d 175, 180-181, 226 N. E. 2d 104, 108 (1967); see 
Keener v. Ridenour, 594 F. 2d 581, 589-591 (CA6 1979) (con-
struing scope of Ohio postconviction remedy); Riley v. 
Havener, 391 F. Supp. 1177, 1179-1180 (ND Ohio 1974) 
(same). But Isaac's claim is manifestly of the sort that could 
not have been raised at trial or on appeal, for the claim only 
came into existence on the day that Isaac's last appeal was 
rejected. Consequently, state postconviction remedies are 
available to Isaac and have not been exhausted. 
I draw three conclusions from the foregoing account, all of 
which to my mind follow ineluctably from the undisputed 
facts of this case. First, Isaac's h~eas petition should have 
been dismissed for his failure to exhaust available state reme-
dies. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971), where we 
emphasized that 
"the federal claim must be fairly presented to the state 
courts. . . . Only if the state courts have had the first 
opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a 
federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of 
the exhaustion of state remedies." 404 U. S., at 
27&--276. 
In the present case, petitioner Engle responded to Isaac's pe-
tition by raising the issue of Isaac's failure to exhaust. 7 
Therefore the Court of Appeals clearly erred, under Picard 
and our whole line of exhaustion precedents, in granting ha-
beas relief to Isaac instead of requiring exhaustion. The 
proper disposition of Isaac's case is thus to reverse and re-
mand with instructions to dismiss on exhaustion grounds. 
The Court's failure to order such a disposition is incom-
prehensible: Less than a month ago this Court emphatically 
reaffirmed the exhaustion doctrine, and indeed extended it, 
announcing a requirement of "total exhaustion" for habeas 
petitions. Rose v. Lundy,-- U. S. --(March 3, 1982).8 
' I d., at pp. 35-36. 
8 "A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state pris-
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But today it finds the nostrum of "cause and prejudice" more 
attractive, and so Rose v. Lundy is not applied. Sic transit 
gloria! In less than a month the bloom is off the Rose. 
My second conclusion is that Isaac simply committed no 
"procedural default" in failing to raise at trial or on direct ap-
peal the claim that appears in his habeas petition. That 
claim did not exist at any time during Isaac's trial or direct 
appeal. Thus the essential factual predicate for an applica-
tion of Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, is completely absent in 
Isaac's case. Sykes involved a habeas petitioner who had 
failed to object in a timely manner to the admission of his con-
fession at trial. 433 U. S., at 86-87. Given that factual 
predicate, Sykes addressed the question of whether federal 
habeas review should be barred absent a showing of "cause" 
for the procedural default of failing to object, and a further 
showing of "prejudice" resulting from the admission of the 
confession. !d., at 87, 90-91. But in the case before us, re-
spondent Isaac could not have made any objection, timely or 
otherwise, at trial or on appeal. Thus the application of 
Sykes is completely and manifestly erroneous in this case. 9 
My last conclusion is that the Court is so intent upon apply-
ing Sykes to Isaac's case that it plays,Procrust~ with his 
claim. In order to bring Isaac's claim within the ambit of 
oners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts 
the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error. As the 
number of prisoners who exhaust all of their federal claims increases, state 
courts may become increasing familiar with and hospitable toward federal 
constitutional issues." Slip op., at 10. 
'The panel opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in Isaac's case reached this same conclusion. The panel correctly 
read Isaac's petition as presenting the question of "whether the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio to withhold from petitioner the benefits of Sec-
tion 2901.05(A), as established in State v. Robinson, for failure to comply 
with Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule was a deprivation of due proc-
ess." 646 F. 2d 1122, 1124 (1980). As to this question, the panel accu-
rately concluded that "Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, is not applicable to ... 
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Sykes, the Court first characterizes his petition as "complex." 
Ante, at 9. 10 Then, without quoting the claim as it actually 
appeared in Isaac's petition, the Court delineates a "colorable 
constitutional claim" nowhere to be found in the petition. As 
the Court recasts it, Isaac's claim is as follows: 
[T]he crime[] charged against [Isaac] require[s] a show-
ing of purposeful or knowing behavior. These terms, 
according to [Isaac], imply a degree of culpability that is 
absent when a person acts in self-defense. . . . Self-de-
fense, [Isaac] urge[s], negates ... [essential] elements 
of criminal behavior. Therefore, once the defendant 
raises the possibility of self-defense, [Isaac] contend[s] 
that the State must disprove that defense as part of its 
task of establishing guilty mens rea, voluntariness, and 
unlawfulness. The Due Process Clause, according to 
[Isaac's] interpretation of Winship, Mullaney, and Pat-
terson, forbids the States from disavowing any portion of 
this burden." Ante, at 12-13. 
This new-modeled claim bears no resemblance to the claim 
actually made by Isaac in his habeas petition. See supra, at 
2-3. 11 But by virtue of this exercise in juristic revisionism, 
the Court puts itself in position to find that "Isaac's" claim 
was "forfeited before the state courts," ante, at 16--no diffi-
cult task, since the claim is wholly imagined by the Court it-
self-thus enabling the Court to reach its clearly sought goal 
of deciding "whether the principles articulated in Wainwright 
v. Sykes, supra, bar consideration of the claim in a federal 
habeas proceeding." Ante, at 14. Unsurprisingly, the 
10 The full text of Isaac's claim appears supra, at pp. 2--3. It is plain that 
the Court's claim of "complexity" is merely a smokescreen, behind which 
the Court feels free to reshape Isaac's claim. 
"It does bear some resemblance to Isaac's claim as construed by the plu-
rality opinion of the Court of Appeals en bane below. 646 F. 2d 1129, 
1133-1136 (1980). But the plurality's construction was simply incorrect, 
and this Court should correct such errors, not perpetuate them. 
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Court's bottom line is that Isaac's fictive claim is indeed 
barred by Sykes. In short, the Court reshapes respondent 
Isaac's actual claim into a form that enables it to foreclose all 
federal review, when as plainly pleaded the claim was unex-
hausted, thus calling for the dismissal of Isaac's petition for 
habeas relief. The Court's analysis is completely result-ori-
ented, and represents a noteworthy exercise in the very jydi-
c'iiiractivi~ that the Court so deprecates in other contexts. -
II 
For the reasons stated above, I conclude that in its un-
seemly rush to reach the merits of Isaac's case, the Court 1la': 
ignored settled law respecting the exhaustion of state reme-
dies. But lest it be thought that my disagreement with to-
day's decision is confined to that point alone, I turn to the 
Court's treatment of the merits of the cases before us. I 
continue to believe that the "deliberate bypass" standard an-
nounced in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), is the only sen-
sible rule to apply in habeas cases such as respondents'. I 
adhere to m,x dissent in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, in 
which l termeJ tlie llcause-and-prejudice" standard adopted 
in that case "a mere house of cards whose foundation has es-
caped any systematic inspection." 433 U. S., at 99-100, n. 
1. The Court has now begun to furnish its house of cards-
and the furniture is as jerry-built as the house itself. 
A 
Sykes did not give the terms "cause" and "prejudice" any 
"precise content," but promised that "later cases" would pro-
vide such content. 433 U. S., at 91. Today the nature of 
that content becomes distressingly apparent. The Court 
still refuses to say what "cause" is: And I predict that on the 
Court's present view it will prove easier for a camel to go 
through the eye of a needle than for a state prisoner to show 
"cause." But on the other hand, the Court is more than ea-
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supported neither by common sense nor by the very reasons 
offered in Sykes for adoption of the "cause and prejudice" 
standard in the first place. 
According to the Court, "cause" is not demonstrated when 
the Court "cannot say that [habeas petitioners] lacked the 
tools to construct their constitutional claim," ante, at 23, 
however primitive those tools were and thus however incho-
ate the claim was when petitioners were in the state courts. 
The Court concludes, after several pages of tortuous reason-
ing, ante, at 21-23, that respondents in the present cases did 
indeed have "the tools" to make their constitutional claims. 
This conclusion is reached by the sheerest inference: It is 
based on citations to other cases in other jurisdictions, where 
other defendants raised other claims assertedly similar to 
those that respondents "could" have raised. Ante, at 21-22 
& n. 39. To hold the present respondents to such a high 
standard of foresight is tantamount to a complete rejection of 
the notion that there is a point before which a claim is so in-
choate that there is adequate "cause" for the failure to raise 
it. In thus rejecting inchoateness as "cause," the Court 
overlooks the fact that none of the rationales used in Sykes to 
justify adoption of the cause-and-prejudice standard can jus-
tify today's definition of "cause." 
Sykes adopted the cause-and-prejudice standard in order 
to accord "greater respect" to state contemporaneous-
objection rules than was assertedly given by Fay v. Noia, 
supra. 433 U. S., at 88. The Court then offered a number 
of reasons why contemporaneous-objection rules should be 
given such greater respect: 
(1) "A contemporaneous objection enables the record 
to be made with respect to the constitutional claim when 
the recollections of witnesses are freshest, not a year 
later in a federal habeas proceeding." 433 U. S., at 88. 
(2) A contemporaneous objection "enables the judge 
who observed the demeanor of those witnesses to make 
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the factual determinations necessary for properly decid-
ing the federal constitutional question." Ibid. 
(3) "A contemporaneous-objection rule may lead to 
the exclusion of evidence objected to, thereby making a 
major contribution to finality in criminal litigation." 
Ibid. 
(4) The Fay v. Noia rule "may encourage 'sandbag-
ging' on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their 
chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court 
with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a 
federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay 
off." I d., at 89. 
(5) A contemporaneous objection rule "encourages the 
result that [criminal trials] be as free of error as possi-
ble." Id., at 90. 
None of these rationales has any force in the present case. 
The first three reasons are valid, if at all, only in the particu-
lar context of objections to the admission of evidence such as 
were at issue in Sykes. As for the "sandbagging" rationale, 
dutifully repeated by today's Court, ante, at 19, n. 33, that 
was fully answered in my Sykes dissent: 12 That argument still 
12 433 U.S., at 103-104 & n. 5: 
"Under the regime of collateral review recognized since the days of Brov.m 
v. Allen [344 U. S. 443 (1953)], and enforced by the Fay bypass test, no 
rational lawyer would risk the 'sandbagging' feared by the Court. . . . In 
brief, the defense lawyer would face two options: (1) He could elect to 
present his constitutional claims to the state courts in a proper fashion. If 
the state trial court is persuaded that a constitutional breach has occurred, 
the remedies dictated by the Constitution would be imposed, the defense 
would be bolstered, and the prosecution accordingly weakened, perhaps 
precluded altogether. If the state court rejects the properly tendered 
claims, the defense has lost nothing: Appellate review before the state 
courts and federal habeas consideration are preserved. (2) He could elect 
to 'sandbag.' This presumably means, first, that he would hold back the 
presentation of his constitutional claim to the trial court, thereby increas-
ing the likelihood of a conviction since the prosecution would be able to 
80--1430---DISSENT 
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"offends common sense," and does not become less offensive 
by sententious repetition. And the final reason-relied on 
again today, ante, at 17-18---is plainly irrelevant to a case in-
volving inchoate constitutional claims. Such claims are ex 
hypothesis so embryonic that only the extraordinarily fore-
sighted criminal defendant will raise them. It is completely 
implausible to expect that the raising of such claims will pre-
dictably-or even occasionally-make trials more "free of 
error." 
B 
The Court justifies its result today with several additional 
reasons-or, rather, · ~entiments'"in reasons' clothing.- We 
are told, ante, at 16--1 r,tnat "the Great Wnt entails signifi-
cant costs. Collateral review of a conviction extends the or-
deal of trial for both society and the accused." But we are 
not told why the accused would consider it an "ordeal" to go 
to federal court in order to attempt to vindicate his constitu-
tional rights. Nor are we told why society should be eager 
to ensure the finality of a conviction arguably tainted by un-
reviewed constitutional error directly affecting the 
truthfinding function of the trial. I simply fail to understand 
how allowance of a habeas hearing "entails significant costs" 
to anyone under the circumstances of the cases before us. 
In a similar vein, we are told, ante, at 18, that "We must 
also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost 
present evidence that, while arguably constitutionally deficient, may be 
highly prejudicial to the defense. Second, he would thereby have forfeited 
all state review and remedies with respect to these claims (subject to what-
ever 'plain error' rule is available). Third, to carry out his scheme, he 
would now be compelled to deceive the federal habeas court and to con-
vince the judge that he did not 'deliberately bypass' the state procedures. 
If he loses on this gamble, all federal review would be barred, and his 
'sandbagging' would have resulted in nothing but the forfeiture of all judi-
cial review of his client's claims. The Court, without substantiation, ap-
parently believes that a meaningful number of lawyers are induced into op-
tion 2 by Fay. I do not. That belief simply offends common sense." 
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society the right to punish admitted offenders." I for one 
will acknowledge nothing of the sort. Respondents were all 
convicted after trials in which they allege that the burden of 
proof respecting their affirmative defenses was imposed upon 
them in an unconstitutional manner. Thus they are not "ad-
mitted" offenders at all: If they had been tried with the 
assertedly proper allocation of the burden of proof, then they 
might very well have been acquitted. Further, it is sheer 
demagoguery to blame the "offender" for the logistical and 
temporal difficulties arising from retrial: If the writ of habeas 
corpus has been granted, then it is at least as reasonable to 
blame the State for having prosecuted the first trial "in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States," 28 
U. S. C. § 2254(a). 
Finally, we are told, ante, at 18 & n. 32, that 
"the Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal sys-
tem. . . . Federal intrusions into state criminal trials 
frustrate the States' sovereign power to punish offel.ld-
ers and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional 
rights. . . . State courts are understandably frustrated 
when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law 
only to have a federal court discover, during a§ 2254 pro-
ceeding, new constitutional commands." 
Once again, the Court drags a red herring across its path. I 
hope that the Court Torgets only momentarily that "the 
States' sovereign power" is limited by the Constitution of the 
United States: that the "intrusion" complained of is that of 
the supreme law of the land. But it must be reason for deep 
concern when this Court forgets, as it certainly does today, 
that "it is a constitution we are expounding," 13 and that it is 
inimical to the principle of federal constitutional supremacy 
to accede to state courts' "frustration" at the requirements of 
federal constitutional law as it is interpreted in an evolving 
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society. Sykes promised that its cause-and-prejudice stand-
ard would "not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudi-
cating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a 
defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be 
the victim of a miscarriage of justice." 433 U. S., at 91. 
Today's decision, with its unvarnished hostility to the asser-
tion of federal constitutional claims, starkly reveals the emp-
tiness of that promise. ~ 
c 
Finally, there is the issue of the Court's extension of the 
Sykes standard "to cases in which the constitutional error 
... affect[s] the truthfinding function of the trial." Ante, at 
19. The Court concedes, ibid., that Sykes itself involved the 
violation of the habeas petitioner's Miranda rights, and that 
although "this defect was serious, it did not affect the deter-
mination of guilt at trial." But despite the fact that the 
present cases admittedly do involve a defect affecting the 
determination of guilt, the Court refuses to limit Sykes and 
thus bars federal review: "We do not believe . . . that the 
principles of Sykes lend themselves to this limitation." Ibid. 
In so holding, the Court ignores the manifest differences be-
tween claims that affect the truthfinding function of the trial 
and claims that do not. 
The Court proclaimed in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 
490 (1976), "the ultimate question of guilt or innocence ... 
should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding." A 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, see Stone, or his 
Miranda rights, see Sykes, may arguably be characterized as 
"crucially different from many other constitutional rights," 
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969) (Black, 
J., dissenting), in that evidence procured in violation of those 
rights has not ordinarily been rendered untrustworthy by the 
means of its procurement. But a defendant's right to a trial 
at which the burden of proof has been constitutionally allo-
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cated can never be violated without rendering the entire trial 
result untrustworthy. "In all kinds of litigation it is plain 
that where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the 
outcome," Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 (1958), and 
petitioners in the present cases concede as much, Brief of Pe-
titioners 22. As Justice Harlan noted in In re Winship, 397 
u. s. 358 (1970), 
"If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial 
were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk 
of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but 
a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convict-
ing the innocent." 397 U. S., at 371 (concurring 
opinion). 
Where, as here, the burden was placed on respondents, 
rather than on the prosecution, to prove their affirmative de-
fenses by a preponderance of the evidence, the risk of con-
victing the innocent is even greater than in Justice Harlan's 
example. And if this allocation of the burden of proof was 
erroneous, then that error constitutes a denial of due process 
of intolerable proportions. We have recognized the truth of 
this proposition in numerous precedents. In Ivan V. v. City 
of New York, 407 U. S. 203 (1972), we held our earlier deci-
sion in Winship to be fully retroactive, stating that 
"'Where the major purpose of a new constitutional 
doctrine is to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that 
substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so 
raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty ver-
dicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete 
retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state 
or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or ac-
cepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration 
of justice has sufficed to require prospective application 
14 
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in these circumstances.' Williams v. United States, 401 
U. S. 646, 653 (1971). See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 
278, 280 (1972); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293, 295 
(1968)." 407 U. 8., at 204 (emphasis added). 14 
In sum, this Court has heretofore adhered to the principle 
that, "In the administration of criminal justice, our society 
imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself," because 
"the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude." 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423-424 (1979). In the 
context of the cases before us today, this principle means that 
a habeas claim that a mistake was made in assigning the risk 
of error cannot be cavalierly dismissed as just another "type 
of claim raised by the prisoner," ante, at 19. In my view, 
the Sykes standard is misguided and insupportable in any 
context. But if it is to be suffered to exist at all, it should be 
limited to the arguable peripheries of the trial process: It 
should not be allowed to insulate from all judicial review all 
violations of the most fundamental rights of the accused. 
I dissent. 
14 We later relied on Ivan V. in holding that our decision in Mullaney 
must be applied retroactively. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 
233, 242-244 (1977). 
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